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Daniel R. Coquillettet
And now it was moved in arrest of judgment, that the building
of the house for hogs was necessary for the sustenance of man:
and one ought not to have so delicate a nose, that he cannot
bear the smell of hogs; for lex nonfavet delicatorum votis: but it
was resolved that the action for it is (as this case is) well main-
tainable; for in a house four things are desired [habitation of
man, pleasure of the inhabitant, necessity of light, and cleanli-
ness of air], and for nusance done to three of them an action
lies ....
-- Sir Edward Coke'
* An earlier version of this Article was presented on March 10, 1977, at the Advanced
Law and Economics Seminar, University of California, Berkeley. The author is particularly
grateful to the Boston University School of Law for a research grant, to his students and
research assistants for their help, and to Professor Milton Katz for his encouragement of
the first version of this paper.
f Member of the Massachusetts Bar. B.A. 1966, Williams College; B.A. (Juris.) 1969,
Oxford University; J.D. 1971, Harvard University.
I William Aldred's Case, 9 Coke 57b, 58a, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817 (K.B. 1611).
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If a man lives in a town, it is necessary that he should subject
himself to the consequences of those operations of trade which
may be carried on in his immediate locality, which are actually
necessary for trade and commerce, and also for the enjoyment
of property, and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town
and of the public at large.
-Lord Westbury2
[T]he wisdom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in a platform
of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into considera-
tion.., what influence laws touching private right of meum and
tuum have into the public state, and how they may be made apt
and agreeable ....
--Francis Bacon3
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INTRODUCTION
PROPERTY DOCTRINE AND JUSTICE
One of the oldest tasks of Anglo-American law has been the
resolution of disputes involving conflicting uses of property. Se-
curity of property historically has been regarded as a paramount
legal need, perhaps the paramount legal need.4 Such security
meant not merely the bare right to title or possession, but also the
right to free use of the property.'
Thus legal history abounds with environmental litigation con-
cerning rights to property use. Commonwealth v. Sisson6 is one
example. Acting pursuant to a state statute, the Massachusetts
Board of Fish and Game Commissioners ordered the defendant
sawmill owners to take measures to stop the pollution of an ad-
joining trout brook with saw dust. The sawmill owners contended
that this deprived them of property without compensation or due
process.' In Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co.,8 the parties' roles were
reversed. The plaintiff, owner of a trailer park, argued that gases
and odors from the defendant's nearby oil refinery wrongfully
deprived him of the use and enjoyment of his property.9 In each
case, a property owner sought court protection from a perceived
threat to his right to the use of his property.10
I For example, the Magna Carta provided that "[n]o free man shall be ... disseised
... except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA
cap. 39 ("1215 Charter"), reprinted and translated in J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 327 (1965).
Neo-Marxists and others long debated whether property rights have been treated as
paramount to rights of personal liberty. During much of English history, a man's liberty
and his relationship to property were interrelated. See generally P. VINOGRADOFF, THE
GROWTH OF THE MANOR 332-65 (2d ed. 1911).
' See generally Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 112-24 (A.
Guest ed. 1961).
6 189 Mass. 247, 75 N.E. 619 (1905).
7 Id. at 249-50, 75 N.E. at 620. The court rejected the defendants' argument, holding
that the legislature has the power to prohibit the pollution of waterways in order to "pro-
tect and preserve edible fish." The legislature can delegate this power to the Board of Fish
and Game Commissioners, and the Board need not base its order on sworn evidence or
afford a hearing to the persons affected. Id. at 251-53, 75 N.E. at 621-22.
a 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953).
9 Id. at 187-89, 77 S.E.2d at 684-86. The court held the plaintiff had established that
the defendant's actions constituted an actionable private nuisance. The evidence supported
a finding that the defendant "intentionally and unreasonably caused noxious gases and
odors to escape onto the nine acres of the plaintiffs to such a degree as to impair in a
substantial manner the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their land." Id. at 194-95, 77 S.E.2d
at 690.
0 For a discussion of what can be "property," see note 228 and accompanying text
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But growth of population and industry has necessarily
jeopardized the unencumbered use of property." English cities
felt this tension at least as early as the sixteenth century.' 2  The
demand on the legal system, then and now, has been to develop
consistent doctrines that both satisfy the needs of society and jus-
tify the curtailment of property owners' and possessors' rights.
Property rights are too fundamental to be determined on an ad
hoc basis.13 Outcomes must be rationalized to winners and losers
alike in terms of a universal property doctrine that society as a
whole accepts as just. This perception of distributive justice can be
almost as important as the actual allocation of resources.' 4 And
legal historians, particularly Maitland, have long recognized that
"known general laws" are at least perceived to "interfere less with
freedom." '5
With this in mind, this Article will exhume, yet again, three
famous cases on Anglo-American property doctrine: William
Aldred's Case,' 6 St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping,'7 and Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad v. Illinois. " These cases are remarkable for their
multitudinous progeny and commentaries. But they are most re-
markable as sources of ideas about history, justice, and the human
environment.
" See, e.g., Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). Cohen noted:
To permit anyone to do absolutely what he likes with his property in creating
noise, smells, or danger of fire, would be to make property in general valueless.
To be really effective, therefore, the right of property must be supported by
restrictions or positive duties on the part of owners, enforced by the state as
much as the right to exclude others which is the essence of property.
Id. at 21.
12 See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
'3 The need for a general property doctrine to legitimate both court action and gov-
ernment policy concerned scholars at the dawn of English legal history. The first com-
prehensive book on English law, written by several hands between 1220 and 1256, was very
much concerned with conceptualized, universal property doctrine. See generally 2 BRACTON
ON THE LAW AND CusTOMs OF ENGLAND 39-48 (S. Thorne trans. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
BRACTON].
" See generally E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 127-44 (1976); Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1089, 1093-1105 (1972).
15 F. MAITLAND, A Historical Sketch of Liberty and Equality as Ideals of English Political
Philosophy from the Time of Hobbes to the Time of Coleridge, in I THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 81 (H. Fisher ed. 1911).
16 9 Coke 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
I I1 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865).
18 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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I
THE NATURAL RIGHTS OF SEISIN DOCTRINE
AND WILLIAM ALDRED'S CASE (1611)
A. Early Private Nuisance Law
The early common law took the position that "[n]o plot of
land [was] 'intire of itselfe.' "19 In addition to the wrong of
wholly depriving a man of possession of his land, disseisina, the
common law recognized the wrong of interfering with property
rights by entering on the land, transgressio. Beginning at least as
early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the law also rem-
edied interference with the use of land from outside that land.20
This last kind of interference was eventually to be called nocumen-
turn or nuisance.
Both "nuisance" and "trespass" "began life as ordinary En-
glish, or rather French, words with no inherent technical signifi-
cance." 21  Nuisance comprises an "annoyance" as opposed to a
19 C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 124 (3d ed. 1976) (quoting JOHN DONNE, Devotions
Upon Emergent Occasions XVII, in JOHN DONNE: COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE 538
(J. Hayward ed. 1929)); see Cohen, supra note 11, at 21; Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance,
65 L.Q. Rav. 480, 481-82 (1949).
20 See Loengard, The Assize of Nuisance: Origins of an Action at Common Law, 37 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 144, 144-47 (1978); Newark, supra note 19, at 481-82. The earliest surviving
Roman law texts also contain the idea that property was not "intire of itselfe." Gaius, who
wrote in the mid-second century A.D., stated that ownership rights existed beyond tangible
"corporeal" things "such as land, a slave, a garment." INSTITUTES OF GAiuS 2.13.
Incorporeal are things that are intangible, such as exist merely in law.... In-
corporeal also are rights attached to urban and rural lands. Examples of the
former are the right to raise one's building and so obstruct a neighbour's lights,
or that of preventing a building from being raised lest neighbouring lights be
obstructed, also the right that a neighbour shall suffer rain-water to pass into
his courtyard ... in a channel or by dripping; also the right to introduce a
sewer into a neighbour's property or to open lights over it.
Id. at 2.14.
21 J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 351 (2d ed. 1979). See C.
FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAw 3-4 (1949); Loengard, supra note 20,
at 158 n.44. In Latin, nocumentum simply meant "harm." Newark, supra note 19, at 481. See
also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 571 n.7 (4th ed. 1971). The
multifarious uses of the term "nuisance" have obscured its history as a private wrong
against land. For instance, "nuisance" could also refer to various forms of petty crimes and
public nuisances actionable only by government officials. Newark, supra note 19, at 481-83.
See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 520 (2d ed.
1898). The confusion between public and private nuisance apparently dates from Y.B.
Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, p1. 10 (1535), reprinted in C. FIFoOT, supra, at 89. In this action for
blocking a highway, "[i~nstead of restating the rule that the existence of the remedy of a
criminal presentment barred the action [one judge] attempted to rationalise it by saying
that to allow the action to one would be to allow it to a hundred." Newark, supra note 19,
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"direct physical harm."2 2  At first, such annoyances were proba-
bly remedied on an ad hoc basis by the many local courts of
medieval England. But eventually some remedies for such harms
to another's free tenement developed into a royal praecipe ("com-
mand") writ, a simple but formal legal remedy. This writ com-
manded a defendant to permit (quod permittat) a plaintiff to exer-
cise a right, or to abate by self-help a hindrance, which interfered
with the plaintiff's seisin of land, but fell short of actually interfer-
ing directly with full land ownership. 2
With the ordinance called the Assize of Novel Disseisin of
1166, Henry II replaced the older "writs of right" by simple, ex-
peditious possessory assizes, with an attractive and novel right to
jury trial. Just as these possessory assizes began to replace the
older remedies for absolute interference with land, the use of
praecipe writs for nuisance was also replaced by a new possessory
remedy. 24  This remedy for nuisance was obtained by using a writ
very similar to, and perhaps a kind of subgroup of, that employed
to bring an action in novel disseisin for the possession of the land
itself.25 The plea rolls of John and Henry III show a frequent
at 483. Thus the peculiar private action in public nuisance was born as an action on the
case that lies only when the plaintiff suffers "a particular damage ... which is not common
to others." E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *56a. This
confusion was then picked up in a 16th century case digest. R. BROOKE, LA GRAUNDE
ABRIDGEMENT (Tottell ed. 1576) (1st ed. London 1573). Following the judicial language, the
editor listed the above Year Book case under both "nuisance" and "action sur le case," com-
pounding the confusion between public and private nuisance actions.
22 J. BAKER, supra note 21, at 351.
23 "ITIhe writs themselves have an ad hoc quality which makes categorisation difficult
and frustrates attempts at tracing evolution of a form ...." Loengard, supra note 20, at
147. For typical praecipe writs defending rights of access to wood, pasture, and proper use
of common pasture short of full ownership, see THE TREATISE ON THE LAW AND CUSTOMS
OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL, bk. 12, chs. 13, 14, at 142-43 (G.
Hall ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as GLANVILL]. Glanvill was written between 1187 and 1189.
Introduction to GLANVILL at xi. See generally C. FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 3-23; 3 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 15, 128-30 (1909); F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF
ACTION AT COMMON LAW 23-29 (A. Claytor & W. Whittaker eds. 1936).
24 According to a new and penetrating analysis by Professor Loengard, the use of a
possessory assize to remedy nuisance was part of the original scheme behind the ordinance
of the assize of novel disseisin, and not a mere judicial interpretation or extension of the
ordinance. Loengard, supra note 20, at 164-66. But see H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, LAW
AND LEGISLATION 109 (1966). See J. BAKER, supra note 21, at 352. See also C. FLOWER, IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE CURIA ROLLS, 1199-1230 A.D., 62 SELDEN SOC'Y 13, 325-34 (1943);
Chew & Kellaway, Introduction to LONDON ASSIZE OF NUISANCE 1301-1431 at xii-xx (London
Record Society repr. 1973); Milsom, Legal Introduction to NovAE NARRATIONES, reprinted in
80 SELDEN Soc'Y at xcvi-civ (1963).
2' For the early forms of such writs, see GLANVILL, supra note 23, at 167-69; EARLY
REGISTERS OF WRITS, reprinted in 87 SELDEN Soc'Y 3, 32 (viscontiel), 70-74, 85, 98, 214-15,
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use of this type of writ, called questus est, in seeking relief from
wrongs to property not amounting to a threat to total possession
of disseisin, but merely to an interference with the enjoyment of a
free tenement.26 The writ required a jury of "twelve free and
lawful men of that neighbourhood to view [the disputed area] ...
[a]nd summon[ed] them ... to be before our justices at the first
"127 Teetsession. The entire action, writ and jury proceeding, became
known as the assize of nuisance.28 Only a private party with a
"freehold estate" could obtain its relief.29
219, 260-62, 271-72 (1970). By the time of Bracton, which was written between 1220 and
1256 (Thorne, Translator's Preface to 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at v), there was a conscious
comparison of the assize of nuisance with that of novel disseisin. In essence, if a wrong arose
entirely on the defendant's land, the assize of nuisance was the appropriate remedy, as it
"extends to another's estate." Id. at 197. But if the wrong was perpetrated on the plaintiff's
land or deprived the plaintiff of his "free tenement" absolutely, the proper remedy was the
assize of novel disseisin. Id. at 197. The writ of nuisance and the writ of novel disseisin were
framed at the same time, if not originally both established, as Loengard suggests, in the
ordinance called the Assize of Novel Disseisin. See note 24 supra. See also D. STENTON,
ENGLISH JUSTICE BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE GREAT CHARTER, 1066-1215, at 42
n.59 (1964); Turner, Introduction to BREVIA PLACITATA, 66 SELDEN Soc'Y at cxix (1947).
26 See, e.g., 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 192-93; C. FiFOOT, supra note 21, at 20. The
writ ran "Iq]uestus est nobis talis quod talls iniuste et sine iudicio levavit quendam murum ...
quandum domum, quandam portam ... in tali villa ad nocumentum liberi tenementi." It translates
as "[sluch a one has complained to us that such a one wrongfully and without judgment
constructed a certain wall (... 'house,' 'gate,'...) in such a vill to the nuisance of his free
tenement." 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 192. For a list of cases involving this writ for
injuries less than disseisin, or total dispossession, see notes 44-45 infra.
27 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 194.
28 The word "assize" derives from the Latin word "assidere," "to set together," as in a
"legislative enactment." 1 JowiTr's DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAw 148 (2d ed. 1977). As
Plucknett stated that:
From this time onwards the word "assize" takes several new meanings; it
began by signifying a solemn session of a council or a court, and soon came to
mean an enactment made at such a meeting; among the most important of
these assizes were those establishing trial by inquisition, and so it soon became
customary to describe the inquisition of twelve men as an assize, while the vari-
ous procedures leading up to this form of trial (which we should now call forms
of action [including the assize of nuisance]) were likewise called assizes. Finally,
travelling justices were established in the thirteenth century in order to try
these assizes more speedily, and these justices were naturally called justices of
assize, and their sessions in the provinces were called the assizes [later
synonymous with local English trial courts, i.e., "Norfolk Assizes"].
T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 112 (5th ed. 1956).
29 C. FiFooT, supra note 21, at 93. This situation existed before the rise of the action on
the case afforded tort relief, even for direct trespass, to plaintiffs who had no property
interests. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 11 & n.3. Prosser stated that "the assize
of nuisance" was "a criminal writ affording incidental civil relief." W. PROSSER, supra note
21, at 572. Legal scholarship other than that cited by Prosser contradicts this view. In
particular, see C. FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 5-11, 93-96. The assize of nuisance was never a
Plea of the Crown, a criminal action in which the King is a party.
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The earliest cases of novel disseisin ad nocumentum liberi
tenementi ("of nuisance to a free hold tenement"), fell into four
classes: (1) interference with a variety of "agricultural diversions
falling short of total disseisin," such as interference with pasture
for cattle or pannage for pigs, (2) obstruction to rights of way, (3)
interference arising from the operation of watermills, and (4) in-
terference with rights to hold fairs or markets. 30 Bracton did con-
tain the notion that the variety of nuisances was infinite. 31 But
the examples given were still strictly tied to servitudes and
freehold ownership, and the assizes of both novel disseisin and nui-
sance were thus denied to one who held only in wardship or for a
term of years or who was in possession only in another's name. 32
Even during its early development, nuisance, as a wrong
against rights in rem, received special treatment relative to wrongs
against legal rights in personam. For example, interference with
The ancient, alternative remedy of self-abatement of nuisance illustrates Prosser's er-
ror. See, e.g., Crakehall v. Anon., Y.B. Trin. 6 Edw. 2 (1313), reprinted in 36 SELDEN SOCI-
ETY 76 (1918). If the injury was flagrant, the complaining property owner could resort to
self-help to eliminate the nuisance. See C. FiFooT, supra note 21, at 9. The period of self-
abatement, during which recourse to the judicial system was unnecessary, was limited. Id.
See 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 189, 192 (party must take action while "misdeed is still
fresh"). If the time period elapsed without any action by the complainant, he had to seek
an assize of novel disseisin or an assize of nuisance, depending upon the location of the
injury. Id. But even under the writs of questus est and quod permittat, the injured party, not
the sheriff, abated the nuisance. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *221-22; 3 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 244.
30 C. FiFOOT, supra note 21, at 5-7.
31 "Nocumenta vero infinita sunt, secundum quod inferius dicetur, quae omnino servitutes tollunt
vel saltem dant impedimentum quo minus commode uti possit servitutibus" ("nuisances which de-
stroy servitudes completely or, at the least, keep them from being used effectively, are
infinite"). 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 189. Cf. Chew & Kellaway, supra note 24, at xxxii
("although not infinite, the nuisances on our rolls are undoubtedly varied").
32 The plaint and remedy by assise does not lie for anyone who is in possession in
the name of another, because he does not possess though he is in possession;
he possesses in whose name the thing is possessed. To possess is very different
from being in possession. These are in possession though they do not possess:
a guardian (sometimes) who holds in demesne though not in fee. A pro-
curator. A household. A bondsman, one's own or another's possessed in good
faith. A farmer or fructuary, though not one who holds in fee farm. A usuary
and a guest. And he who holds at will, from day to day [or] from year to year,
though he may vouch a warrantor, according to some, as a usufructuary who
holds for a term of years. Such persons will have neither the plaint nor the
remedy by assise, because they have no action; the owner has it, and thus, if
they sue, the exception of property and free tenement lies against them, no
matter by what kind of disseisor it is raised, whether he has the right to eject
or not.
3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 33 (footnotes omitted).
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rights in rem did not constitute a single wrong but a continuous
wrong which lasted until the status quo was restored.33 As a re-
sult, at least theoretically, an injured party could institute an un-
limited number of assizes of nuisance until the wrong had ceased,
with damages awarded at each assize. 34  This doctrine formed the
historical basis of a later and most potent remedy for private nui-
sance, the equitable injunction.35
To be actionable, a nuisance had to result in both injuria
(legal injury) and damnum (material damage).36  These concepts
were distinguished in Bracton: If you built a mill on your land,
taking customers from my mill, there was damnum to me, but no
injuria. 37  A necessary element of injuria was omne id quod non iure
fit ("anything wrongfully done").38 The meaning of this crucial
phrase was unclear for centuries; 39 perhaps there was no uniform
definition. The Year Book cases treat these wrongs as interferences
with the "natural rights" of the property owner or possessor.40
Such "natural rights" arose solely through the operation of the
11 See Beswick v. Cunden, Cro. Eliz. 402, 402, 78 Eng. Rep. 646, 647 (Q.B. 1592) ("the
case in 14 & 15 Eliz. Dyer, 319. is good law; for there the Lady Brown made a new
nusance by every turning of the cock, for which she was punishable, although she made it
not at the first"); F. MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 77-78. This rule was later modified in
Penruddock's Case, 5 Coke 100b, 77 Eng. Rep. 210 (C.P. 1598), which held that an action
may lie directly against the person beginning a nuisance and continue as long as the wrong
persists, but that a request to remedy is necessary before the right of action continues
against a new neighbor who continues a nuisance begun by another.
34 See F. MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 77-78.
35 Occasionally, an early common law court would grant specific performance or issue a
writ of prohibition that had almost the same effect as an injunction. See T. PLucKNE'r,
supra note 28, at 678. Whether these were ever used for a nocumentum is apparently un-
known. For discussions of the modern use of the injunction as a nuisance remedy, see
Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920: Equitable Relief Against Torts, 34 HARV. L. REv.
388, 392-400 (1921); Note, Injunctions against Private Nuisances, 22 HARV. L. REv. 596,
596-97 (1909). For a discussion of the standards for injunctive relief, see Riter v. Keokuk
Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Elliot Nursery Co. v. Duquesne
Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345 (1924).
2 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 21, at 534.
a 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 164, 189, 195-96, 199; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
supra note 21, at 534. See also 2 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 140, 267.
38 2 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 140.
'9 See generally McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, I U. FLA. L.
RFv. 27 (1948); Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189 (1931).
4' For what Holdsworth called "natural rights incident to ownership," see Y.B. Trin. 18
Edw. 3 (1344), reprinted in ROLL SERiES 210 (1904); Y.B. Pasch. 12 Edw. 3 (1338), reprinted
in ROLL SERIES 464 (1883); Y.B. Hil. 35 Edw. 1 (1307), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 456 (1879);
Y.B. Mich. 30 Edw. 1 (1302), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 40 (1863); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 23, at 129. See also J. BAKER, supra note 21, at 356-60; C. FiFooT, supra note 21, at 8,
95; Newark, supra note 19, at 482.
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property law and did not depend on an express grant or prescrip-
tion.41  Furthermore, they could not be taken away by express
grant or prescription. 42  For example, there could be no ease-
ment of "foul smell" over another's property. 43
In 1444, Judge Markham said "[ilf a man builds a house and
stops up the light coming to my house, or causes the rain to fall
from his house and so undermines my house, or does anything
which injures my free tenement, I shall have the assize of nui-
sance." 44 The "natural rights" of seisin apparently included pro-
tection against interference with the owner's residential use or en-
joyment of the property together with direct interference with any
economic use of the land that was an exclusive legal 1 ight of the
owner.
45
Such interference with residential use was enough to consti-
tute an injuria, and any resulting damnum gave rise to a right of
action. The requisite interference could be extremely indirect. For
example, injuria could result from foul smells, uncomfortable
temperature, excessive noise, or the cutting off of light. Moreover,
"' 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 163, 189-90. See F. POLLOCK, JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
ESSAYS 108 (A. Goodhart ed. 1961); A. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF
THE LAND LAW 101, 246 (1961).
42 Fowler v. Sanders, Cro. Jac. 446, 446, 79 Eng. Rep. 382, 382 (K.B. 1617).
4 A. SIMPSON, supra note 41, at 246.
44 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 129 (quoting Y.B. Mich. 22 Hen. 6, pl. 23
(1443)). See Y.B. Mich. 30 Edw. 1 (1301), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 22 (1863). But cf. Bowry
and Popes Case, 1 Leon. 168, 74 Eng. Rep. 155 (C.P. 1588) (stopping up recently built
window not actionable).
41 See Y.B. Trin. 18 Edw. 3, f. 22, pl. 1 (1344), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 210 (1904)
(construction of house so that rain fell on plaintiff's house); Y.B. Trin. 18 Edw. 3, f. 22, pl.
2 (1344), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 210 (1904) (construction of house so that drainage of
plaintiff's house impaired); Y.B. Pasch. 12 Edw. 3 (1338), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 468
(1883) (construction of wall so that rain fell on plaintiff's house); Y.B. Pasch. 12 Edw. 3
(1338), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 466 (1883) (construction of weir downstream from
another); Y.B. Pasch. 12 Edw. 3 (1331), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 464 (1883) (diversion of
stream from plaintiff's land); Grave v. Shorne, Y.B. Hil. 8 Edw. 2, pl. 2 (1315), reprinted in
41 SELDEN SOCIETY 1 (1924) (disseisin of common pasture); Crakehall v. Anonymous, Y.B.
Trin. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 21 (1313), reprinted in 36 SELDEN SOCIETY 76 (1918) (diversion of stream
from one mill to another); Burnhill v. Ringtherose, Y.B. Trin. 3 Edw. 2, pl. 30 (1310),
reprinted in 20 SELDEN SOCIETY 200 (1905) (failure to have corn from certain land ground
at plaintiff's mill); Y.B. Mich. 31 Edw. 1 (1303), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 404 (1863) (con-
struction of weir upstream from mill); Y.B. 22 Edw. 1 (1294), reprinted in ROLL SERIES 568
(1873) (holding of market in same town as existing market); Y.B. 21 Edw. 1 (1293), re-
printed in ROLL SERIES 414 (1866) (construction of pool on adjoining land); Wildeker v. Ros,
Bracton's Note Book, pl. 685 (1232), reprinted in C. FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 16 (disseisin of
estovers); Abbot of Meaux's Case, Assize Roll 1040, mem. 4, pl. 91 (1219), reprinted in 56
SELDEN SOcIETY 39 (1937) (obstruction of right of way).
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it was argued that the damnum could be to simple enjoyment. 46
But, as discussed before, no amount of harm gave rise to action-
able damages unless the injury was of a type legally recognized as
giving a right of action.
46 The issue of "whether the law took any notice of 'things of pleasure' as opposed to
things of profit" was a repeatedly contested issue through the sixteenth century. See Baker,
Introduction to 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, reprinted in 94 SELDEN Soc'Y 35-36,
234-36 (1977). In 1530 one judge argued that "it is necessary for every man of ability to
have pleasures; and when this pleasure is destroyed, is it not reason that he should have
damages therefor? (As if to say yes)." Y.B. 21 Hen. 8, Keil. 203, pl. 1 (1530), translation
quoted in Baker, supra, at 36. Temperature, light, smell and reasonable quiet unquestionably
were protected.
[I]f a man makes an oven for making chalk or pots ... and by the heat of the
fire my house becomes so hot that I cannot live there ... this is nuisance.... In
the same way, if one makes a forge so near my house that I cannot hear in my
house because of the striking of the hammer, it is nuisance. In the same way, if
one makes a common slaughterhouse which proves so bad that on account of
the evil smell I cannot live in my house, it is nuisance. It is the same of a la-
trine ....
Treherne, Lincoln's Inn Reading on Forest Laws (1520), conflated and quoted in Baker, supra, at
235.
[B]y the Common law, one shall not hurt the Freehold of another, and no
greater hurt, greivance, or dammage can be done to any mans Freehold, then
to take away the light and ayre thereof, which is comfortable, & commodious
for him, for when this light, and ayre are taken from him, his house remaineth
as a dungeon.
Hales' Case, [unreported] (c. 1560) (argument, Wraye), printed in A BmiErE DECLARATION
FOR WHAT MANNER OF SPECIALL NUSANCE CONCERNING PRIVATE DWELLING HoUsES, A MAN
MAY HAVE HIS REMEDY BY AssIsE, OR OTHER ACTION AS THE CASE REQUIRES 11 (London
1636) [hereinafter cited as DECLARATION]; see also J. BAKER, supra note 21, at 357 n.13. But
in the same case a contrary argument was made by Manwood:
I will agree with you, that if all your windowes were stopped, that an action will
lie, and where you say sic utere tuo ut alienum non ladas, this is not meant of
things of pleasure, but of things of profit. And here is not any part of your
house consumed, but herein a let of your pleasure onely, for which your action
is not maintaineable.
DECLARATION, supra, at 20-21.
The debate on aesthetics continued into the 18th century in the context of indictment
for public nuisance. Lord Mansfield, while reviewing a case in which the defendants had
been convicted of a public nuisance "for erecting and continuing their works at
Twickenham, for making acid spirit of sulphur, oil of vitriol, and oil of aqua fortis," stated
that "it is not necessary that the smell [caused by defendants' operations] should be un-
wholesome: it is enough, if it renders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable."
Rex v. White, 1 Burr. 333, 337, 97 Eng. Rep. 338, 340 (K.B. 1757). Indeed, in one case
mere storage of "great quantities of gun powder" was held to be, ipso facto, a public nui-
sance, without any physical damage at all. Rex v. Taylor, 2 Strange 1167, 1167, 93 Eng.
Rep. 1104, 1104 (K.B. 1741). Apparently, the anxiety alone was actionable. "So also it will
be a nuisance, if life is made uncomfortable by the apprehension of danger . 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 171 n.3 (19th ed. J. Chitty ed. 1857).
It is unclear whether American nuisance law ever historically accepted purely "mental
discomfort" or damage to aesthetics as actionable per se. See Chafee, supra note 35, at 393.
Cf. Larremore, Public Aesthetics, 20 HARV. L. REv. 35, 42-45 (1906) (advocating such accep-
tance).
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If [the defendant] cannot be prohibited by law from doing it,
though he creates a nuisance and causes damage it will not be
wrongful, for each may do on his own property [whatever he
wishes if] wrongful damages does not accrue to a neighbour, as
where one erects a mill on his own land and takes from his
neighbour his own suit and that of others; he does his
neighbour damages but no injuria since he is not prohibited by
law or a constitution from having or erecting a mill. 47
Cutting off a neighbor's light, however, was argued to be action-
able even though the damnum could be characterized as interfering
with enjoyment and not profit.48
Anything, therefore, "erected, made, or done not on the soil
possessed by the complainant" 49 that interfered with the "free en-
joyment" guaranteed by seisin was a wrong that could be remedied
by the assize of nuisance.5" As Bracton stated, there was a "serv-
itude ... imposed on another's land by law, not by man ... by
which one is prohibited from doing on his own land what may
damage a neighbor." 51 The "natural rights" incident to seisin
were among the earliest legally protected rights, and courts vigor-
ously debated the limitations of damnum and injuria.
B. Sic Utere Tuo Doctrine
Even in 1600 it was still unclear exactly what constituted these
natural rights" of seisin.5 e  As in many other areas of the com-
mon law, the task of clarification fell to Sir Edward Coke. He
undertook this task, like many others, by writing a report of a
"case in point," a report which may or may not have accurately
reflected the actual case.5 n
11 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 164 (footnotes omitted).
48 See note 46 supra. Substantial blockage of light was actionable, but probably not just
some interference with a view. See William Aldred's Case, 9 Coke 57b, 58a-58b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 816, 817-21 (K.B. 1611) (quoting Bland v. Moseley, [unreported] (K.B. 1587) (Wray,
C.J.) );J. BAKER, supra note 21, at 357-58. Butsee Bury v. Pope, Cro. Eliz. 118, 118, 78 Eng.
Rep. 375, 375 (Ex. Ch. 1588) (interference with windows not actionable "for it was [the
plaintiff's] folly to build his house so near to the other's land"). "[Tihe right to clean air,
undiverted and unpolluted water, light, and quiet, seems to have been incident to house
ownership in general." Baker, supra note 46, at 235.
19 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 21, at 53.
50 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 11. Novel disseisin, on the other hand, protected
"undisturbed possession" of property. Id.
51 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 189-90. See also id. at 163-64, 191.
52 See C. FFOOT, supra note 21, at 95.
" Plucknett explained Coke's case-reporting philosophy. "There was no clear boundary
in [Coke's] mind between what a case said and what he thought it ought to say .... A case
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The case was William Aldred's Case.54 The pleadings were
simple. The plaintiff brought an action on the case against the
defendant for erecting a hog sty near the plaintiff's house. The
sty allegedly fouled the air in the house and cut off the plaintiffs
light. These allegations were found to be true at the Norfolk As-
sizes, and damages were assessed.55 The defendant appealed to
the King's Bench, arguing:
(1) That there was no damnum to the plaintiff in the "corrupted
air"-because the law should not favor delicate wishes, "one
ought not to have so delicate a nose, that he cannot bear
the smell of hogs";56
(2) that the blocking of windows was permitted by a local cus-
tom; 57 and
(3) "that the building of the house for hogs was necessary for
the sustenance of man."5 8
The pleadings present two points of great interest. First, the
plaintiff brought an action on the case rather than the older assize
of nuisance. As indicated before, the assize of nuisance had from
its inception been carefully restricted to plaintiffs seized of a
freehold estate. This excluded some important potential plaintiffs,
including leaseholders, copyholders, guardians, and holders of
rights of commons.59 But by 1500, plaintiffs were frequently
bringing nuisance actions by use of the new action on the case,
which permitted an action on a "case stated" where a remedy was
not already available through an older form of action. 60  This de-
in Coke's Reports .... is dominated by Coke's personality, and derives its authority from
him." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 28, at 281. Coke's Reports contained other cases that
clarified nuisance doctrine. See, e.g., Robert Marys's Case, 9 Coke 11 lb, 77 Eng. Rep. 895
(K.B. 1613) (interference with commons, action on case by commoner, distinction from
public nuisance); Baten's Case, 9 Coke 53b, 77 Eng. Rep. 810 (K.B. 1611) (overhang,
abatement, pleading); Williams's Case, 5 Coke 72b, 77 Eng. Rep. 163 (K.B. 1592) (public
"common" nuisance); Penruddock's Case, 5 Coke 100b, 77 Eng. Rep. 210 (C.P. 1598)
(proper party, continuing wrong, abatement).
54 9 Coke 57b, 77 Eng. Rep 816 (K.B. 1611).
" Id. at 58a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817.
56 Id., 77 Eng. Rep. at 817.
57 Id. at 58b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 820.
5' Id. at 58a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817.
" See note 29 and accompanying text supra. See also C. FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 93;
Baker, supra note 46, at 233.
60 See Baker, supra note 46, at 232-33. At least one school of thought has traced the
origins of the action on the case to the in consimili casu section of the Statute of Westmins-
ter II, 13 Edw. 1, Stat. 1, c. 24 (1285), reprinted in A. KIRALFY, A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH
LAW 138-39 (1957). See C. FFOOT, supra note 21, at 66-68. This section specifically declared
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velopment made a nuisance remedy available to lessees for years
and tenants in common, and also confirmed that remedies could
be obtained for nuisances caused by nonfeasance or by persons
other than the adjacent freeholder. 61  Indeed, the advantages of
case, including simplified pleading, damages, and greater expedi-
tion, led even those plaintiffs whose cause of action lay within the
traditional assize to attempt to use the new form.62
These attempts were resisted on the grounds that the new
"case" remedy should never be available if the older assize were
appropriate. 63  Not long before William Aldred's Case, however, all
the common law judges, meeting as the Exchequer Chamber, de-
cided in Cantrel v. Church64 that any nuisance plaintiff could have
his election of case or the assize. 65  Obviously a careful plaintiff
that a quod permittat writ for a nuisance "shall not be denied" if the offending "House, Wall,
or such" was "aliened to another." A. KIRALFY, supra, at 138. The statute provided that
"[blut from henceforth, where in one Case a Writ is granted, in like Case, requiring like
Remedies, the Writ shall be made as hath been used before." Id. See E. COKE, THE SECOND
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LA-,vS OF ENGLAND *404-05. It is now doubted that the
flexible, adaptive action on the case really originated in the statute, but the use of nuisance
as a key illustrative example in the Statute of Westminster II remains of interest. See C.
FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 68.
01 And if a man levy a nusance unto the house of another who hath therein an
estate but for term of years, then he shall not have an assize of nusance, but an
action upon the case against him, because he hath no freehold: but yet it
seemeth, he may enter and abate the nusance.
A. FITZ-HERBERT, THE NEw NATURA BREVIUM *185. "The function of the Assize was to
abate the nuisance; action on the case lay only for damages." McRae, supra note 39, at 39.
See Baker, supra note 46, at 233.
"2 See id. at 233-36. See Yevance v. Holcomb, 2 Dyer 250b, 250b n.88, 73 Eng. Rep.
553, 553 n.88 (K.B. 1566). Before 1600 plaintiffs enjoyed only spotty success in alleging
case when the assize would have sufficed. See C. FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 94-95. Compare
Beswick v. Cunden, Cro. Eliz. 520, 78 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1596) with Alston v. Pamphyn,
Cro. Eliz. 466, 78 Eng. Rep. 719 (Q.B. 1596). See also Leverett v. Townsend, Cro. Eliz. 198,
78 Eng. Rep. 454 (Q.B. 1590).
" "The exercise of a nice discrimination would thus keep the Register tidy; but liti-
gants might be forgiven if they felt the purchase of an archaic writ too heavy a price to pay
for the preservation of juristic elegance." C. FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 94.
04 Cro. Eliz. 845, 78 Eng. Rep. 1072 (Ex. Ch. 1601).
05 [The judges] resolved, that the action was well brought, for [the plaintiff] hath
election to bring either the one or the other: for although there had a differ-
ence been taken, where the way is so stopped up, that he loseth the use thereof
altogether, and thereby his common, there an assise shall lie; but where it is
estopped but in part, and not totally, that there an action upon the case lies,
and not an assise; they conceived it not to be any difference, for he hath elec-
tion to have either the one or the other action; especially as this case is, where
it appears not that the stopping was made by him who is the tenant of the
freehold; but it might be done by a stranger who hath nothing to do with the
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would always allege in case, so that lack of a free tenement could
not be argued at bar. Thus the assize of nuisance, although it
historically preceded all actions on the case, was assimilated into
the action on the case after 1601. Following the decision in Cantrel
v. Church, a person with any possessory interest in land inherited
the "natural rights" of seisin protected by the historic assize of nui-
sance, and perhaps more, but under the new guise of action on
the case in nuisance. The plaintiff in William Aldred's Case, clearly
well advised by his lawyer, used the new, safer form of nuisance
action.6 6
The second remarkable pleading in William Aldred's Case-the
defendant's pleading that "the building of the house for hogs was
necessary for the sustenance of man" 67-marks an even greater
milestone in the law of nuisance. Never before had a defendant so
clearly claimed social utility as a defense to a nuisance action. This
pleading in itself makes William Aldred's Case a landmark in the
law.
Nevertheless, the case has been most famous for its holding.
Confronted with these pleadings, the court, according to Coke,
dismissed all of the defendant's objections and upheld the award
of the Norfolk Assizes. In doing so it made two major statements
on the law of nuisance. First, the court stated that any injury to
the plaintiff's enjoyment of his land was actionable so long as the
injury pertained to a matter of necessity such as wholesome air or
light.6 8 Purely aesthetic damage, however, was beyond the scope
of the action.
[F]or prospect, which is a matter only of delight, and not of
necessity, no action lies for stopping thereof, and yet it is a
great commendation of a house if it has a long and large pros-
pect ... But the law does not give an action for such things of
delight.6 9
land, or by one who hath but a term thierein. Wherefore they all resolved, that
the action was well brought; thereupon the judgment was affirmed.
Id. at 845, 78 Eng. Rep. at 1072 (footnote omitted).
66 The court in William Aldred's Case stated that: "The plaintiff in this as in all other
possessory actions, may declare upon his possession without alledging the precise estate of
which he is seised ...." 9 Coke at 57b n.(A), 77 Eng. Rep. at 816 n.(A).
67 Id. at 58a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817.
68 Id. at 58b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
6" Id., 77 Eng. Rep. at 821 (citing Bland v. Moseley, [unreported] (K.B. 1587) (Wray,
C.J.), summarized in 2 W. HUGHES, THE GRAND ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 1369 (London
1662)). For another early precedent, see Hales' Case, [unreported] (c. 1560), printed in
DECLARATION, supra note 46, discussed in notes 94-96 and accompanying text infra.
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This rule placed a clear limitation on the "natural rights" of
seisin. Courts could insist not only on a legal wrong, but also on
damage to a thing of necessity. The question of what constituted
such a necessity would be subject to demurrer, a question of law
to be decided by the court.7 °
Having accorded itself this much discretion, the court drew
the line. In its second major statement, the court in William
Aldred's Case delineated the rule of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
(so use your own property as not to injure your neighbors). 71
This rule responded directly to the defendant's allegation in the
pleadings that social utility justified some interferences. The court
explicitly rejected this defense.
[T]he building of a lime-kiln is good and profitable; but if it be
built so near a house, that when it burns the smoke thereof
enters into the house, so that none can dwell there, an action
lies for it. So if a man has a watercourse running in a ditch
from the river to his house, for his necessary use; if a glover
sets up a lime-pit for calve skins and sheep skins so near the
said watercourse that the corruption of the lime-pit has cor-
rupted it, for which cause his tenants leave the said house, an
action on the case lies for it, . .. and this stands with the rule of
law and reason, . . sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.7
The decision in William Aldred's Case was, therefore, a two-
part ruling which, while finding an absolute right to enjoyment of
certain property rights, gave the court some discretion to deter-
mine the nature of those rights. The necessity rule meant that the
court could disallow some kinds of nuisance damages as a matter
of law. The stench of the hogs and the cutting off of the light in
William Aldred's Case interfered with such things of necessity as
light ("necessitas luminis") and clean air ("salubritas aeris"), and the
action was good. 73
Given actionable damage, the defendant could not, however,
ask the courts to balance social utilities. The court did not quarrel
with the defendant's argument that a hog building was "necessary
" 9 Coke at 58b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 820-21.
71 This famous Latin maxim was derived from Ulpian and is related to the general
Roman principle "expedit reipublicae ne sua re quis male utatur." INSTITUTES 1.8.2 (it is for the
public good that no one should misuse his own property). See J. BAKER, supra note 21, at
354.
72 9 Coke at 58b-59a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821 (citing the Prior of Southwark's Case, Y.B.
Trin. 13 Hen. 7, f. 26, pl. 4 (1498), reprinted in C. FiFOOT, supra note 21, at 87).
" 9 Coke at 58a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817.
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for the sustenance of man," and it called a lime-kiln "good and
profitable." It simply said that once the defendant's activities
threatened something necessary for the enjoyment of another's
property, these arguments could not avail at law. To this extent,
William Aldred's Case forcefully ratified the old "natural rights" of
seisin.
Two minor points in the decision remain. First, the court did
not discuss the hog-keeper's argument that the smell was de
minimis: "one ought not to have so delicate a nose that he cannot
bear the smell of hogs."75  The defense of de minimis was inher-
ent in the original definition of nuisance as one's "doing on his
own land what may damage a neighbour."76  Even today, one
conceptual difficulty of private nuisance is that some significant
degree of damage is inherent in the definition of injury. Thus,
the classical Year Book distinction between damnum and injuria was
somewhat artificial. The court in William Aldred's Casa evidently
considered the requisite degree of damage as a matter of fact al-
ready determined by the Norfolk jury's finding that the injuria of
nuisance existed,77 and saw as its task merely to determine, as a
matter of law, whether the damnum was actionable.
Second, the declaration alleged that the defendant built the
sty "maliciously intending to deprive the plaintiff of the use and
profit of his house."78  The court and parties ignored this plead-
ing probably because the words "maliciously intending" were only
words of art, or non-transversable pleadings, carried over into ac-
tion on the case from its ancestor, the writ of trespass. By 1611,
the words were recited as an empty formality, with no apparent
connection to the kind of action on the case that was involved or
to any other point of law, and they did not mean that an action
71 Id. at 59a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
71 Id. at 58a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817.
76 3 BRaCTON, supra note 13, at 190. See Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184
Or. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948); Bridlington Relay, Ltd. v. Yorkshire Elec. Bd., [1965] Ch.
436; Eastern & S. African Tel. Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Cos., [1902] A.C. 381; 62
HARV. L. REv. 704, 705 (1949).
For a discussion of what constitutes "damage" in England today and a critique of the
extension of the de minimis defense in Bridlington Relay, see G. FRIDMAN, MODERN TORT
CASES 182-84 (1968). Fridman warns that a too strict view of what constitutes actionable
nuisance damage may "lead to a restriction of the utility of that tort as a means of protect-
ing lawful interests in the use of land. That would be to stultify the idea, and reduce the
value of liability in nuisance." Id. at 184.
9 Coke at 58a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817.
78 Id. at 59a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821-22.
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on the case in nuisance required malice, or even intent. 79 The
older assize of nuisance, from which the new form of action on
the case for nuisance took its substantive inspiration,8 0 never in-
volved questions of fault in the modern sense.8" As in William
Aldred's Case, English courts and lawyers, aware of the grafting of
the substance of the nuisance assize to the action on the case, did
not read the pleadings as requiring a fault element for private
nuisance.82 In a much later period, however, some American
courts became confused by these words of art in the old pleadings
and saw them as requiring fault or intent for an actionable nui-
sance.
8 3
History provides two probable explanations for the William
Aldred's Case court's decision to change the old Year Book rules and
to take on more discretion as to actionable harm. First, plaintiffs
of a middle-class, yeomen background were employing the action
on the case in nuisance in the national courts.8 4 Many of these
men were probably tenants for years, or copyholders without the
freehold estate or freehold tenure required for the assize of nui-
sance, but with enough possessory interest in land to satisfy the
action on the case requirements of Cantrel v. Church, the 1601 case
11 See C. FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 76-78. For the continuing juristic problem of legal
"fault" in nuisance actions, see note 185 infra.
80 See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
81 See 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 189-90; A. FITZ-HERBERT, THE NEW NATURA
BREViUM *183-85.
82 See CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS 1393-95, at 781-85 (13th ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as CLERK & LINDSELL].
83 See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 1.24, at 67-70 (1956); Prosser, Nuisance
Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 399, 416-17 (1942). See generally M. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 102 (1977). Benjamin Cardozo recognized
the confusion arising from the old forms of action. See McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls,
247 N.Y. 340, 343-44, 160 N.E. 391, 391-92 (1928). He recognized that traditional nui-
sance doctrine contained no fault requirement; harmful acts amounting to a nuisance were
absolutely prohibited.
The primary meaning [of nuisance] does not involve the element of negligence
as one of its essential factors .... One acts sometimes at one's peril. In such
circumstances, the duty to desist is absolute whenever conduct, if persisted in,
brings damages to another .... Illustrations are abundant. One who emits
noxious fumes or gases day by day in the running of his factory may be liable
to his neighbor though he has taken all available precautions ... . He is not to
do such things at all, whether he is negligent or careful.
Id. at 343, 160 N.E. at 391-93. See also United Elec. Light Co. v. Deliso Constr. Co., 315
Mass. 313, 52 N.E.2d 553 (1943) ("A nuisance might exist in the absence of negligence.").
For a modern formulation of the American view, see Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negli-
gence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. REv. 984, 986-88, 995-96 (1952). Seavey challenged
Judge Cardozo's analysis in part, and suggested that the McFarlane opinion has been mis-
understood and that Judge Cardozo's language has caused confusion. Id. at 990-95.
84 See C. FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 94-95; notes 59-66 and accompanying text supra.
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that significantly opened the courthouse doors.8 5  Before these
plaintiffs had access to the national courts, they apparently had
brought their cases before local presentment juries which decided
cases informally and probably used rules of thumb similar to the
necessity test.8 6 These parties contrast sharply with the priors
and "lords of the vill" who fill the Year Book cases,8 7 and their
property conflicts defy resolution in terms of the aesthetic
privileges discussed in older English cases.88
The second reason for the new rule probably was the increas-
ing population of British cities and the struggle for space within
those cities. For example, between 1400 and 1600, open space in
London disappeared dramatically. The population grew from
nearly 100,000 in 1554, to 200,000 in 1602.9
This combination of new parties with new needs and the in-
creasing population density of the cities prompted a more restric-
tive rule of nuisance harm than that found in the Year Books. 90
Coke's analysis of William Aldred's Cdse was an attempt to meet
these social conditions with a rule that preserved reasonable prop-
erty rights. Such leading seventeenth century cases as Jones v.
Powell,9 Morley v. Pragnel,9 2 and even Turberville v. Stamp,9 3 fol-
85 Cro. Eliz. 845, 78 Eng. Rep. 1072 (Ex. Ch. 1601). See notes 59-66 and accompanying
text supra.
86 See J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 268-69 (1960). Professor Dawson notes
that a major cause of complaints was, as in William Aldred's Case, pigs. Id. at 269. Dawson
further notes that" 'hundreds of folio pages of Jury orders relate to swine alone and their
numerous misdeeds and nuisances."' Id. at 270 n.210 (quoting S. WEBB & B. WEBB, ENG-
LISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT
104 (1908)). The jurors in Southampton, in despair at the number of pig offenses, declared
that: "'we thinck yt mete' that every man in town should keep pigs 'so that when the
thinge is as the worste shame may redresse yt."' Id. at 270 (quoting SOUTHAMPTON COURT
LEET RECORDS 1, 7, 17 (1550)).
17 See note 45 supra.
88 See note 69 supra.
89 2 G. TREVELYAN, ILLUSTRATED ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY 4 (1949). The population is
also thought to have increased by one-fifth between 1525 and 1545. See Baker, supra note
46, at 47.
90 Even the pig problems became worse in the cities. See J. DAWSON, supra note 86, at
269; see generally DECLARATION, supra note 46, at 15 ("Swine are beasts that may cause
diseases to be in a City").
91 Hut. 135, 123 Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P. 1628).
92 Cro. Car. 510, 79 Eng. Rep. 1039 (K.B. 1638). In Morley, the plaintiff was an
innkeeper. His business was threatened by the "stench" of a neighboring tallow furnace,
and he brought an action upon the case. After a jury verdict for the innkeeper, the defen-
dant appealed on the grounds that "he, being a tallow-chandler, ought to use his trade,
which cannot be said to be a nusance." Id. at 510, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1040. The King's Bench
dismissed the defense. See also H. ROLLE, UN ABRIDGMENT DES PLUSIEURS CASES r" REso-
LUTIONS DEL COMMON LEY 89, 140-41 (London 1668) (case rejecting utility defence for lead
smelting operation).
03 12 Mod. 151, 88 Eng. Rep. 1228 (K.B. 1697). Turberville, however, was an excellent
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:761
lowed this sic utere tuo rule carefully. In 1636 a book appeared
that was directed precisely at the doctrine. This book, entitled A
Briefe Declaration For What manner of speciall Nusance concerning pri-
vate dwelling Houses, a man may have his remedy by Assise, or other
Action as the Case requires,94 collected four much earlier arguments
by Mounson, Plowden, Wray, and Manwood, 95 and strongly
reemphasized the basic issues set out in William Aldred's Case.96
Critics of the sic utere tuo doctrine have rarely appreciated Wil-
liam Aldred's Case and the court's careful attempt to preserve an
absolute standard of property security, while disqualifying un-
reasonable damages. 97  For example, Lord Wright, in the leading
example of the gray area between nuisance law and a developing fault doctrine in negli-
gence. The Turberville court stated:
Every man must so use his own as not to injure another. The law is general;
the fire which a man makes in the fields is as much his fire as his fire in his
house ... and he must at his peril take care that it does not, through his ne-
glect, injure his neighbour: if he kindle it at a proper time and place, and the
violence of the wind carry it into his neighbour's ground, ... this is fit to be
given in evidence. But now here it is found to have been by his negligence ....
Id. at 152, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1228-29. See C. FiFOoT, supra note 21, at 156. Problems of fault
in "escape" cases finally led to the complex Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine. See note 185 and
accompanying text infra. See also Rex v. Rosewell, 2 Salk. 459, 91 Eng. Rep. 397 (K.B.
1699) (self help for wrongfully stopped lights or escaping water).
9' DECLARATION, supra note 46.
" The arguments were originally set forth in Hales' Case, [unreported] (c. 1560),
printed in DECLARATION, supra note 46. Hales' Case involved windows blocked by city build-
ing, and city customs similar to those at issue in Bland v. Moseley, [unreported] (K.B. 1587),
discussed in note 69 supra. Whereas Bland arose in York, Hales' Case arose in London, "the
greatest City, and most populous in this Realme, and the more populous the more hon-
ourable, & the more buildings, the more populous and honourable will it be." DECLARA-
TION, supra note 46, at 23. The four arguments, two on each side of the case, essentially
assume the basic necessity test, later incorporated into the rationale of William Aldred's Case.
96 Mounson stated that: "Therefore who so taketh from man so great a commodity as
that which preserveth mans health in his castle, or house, doth in a manner as great wrong
as if he deseised him altogether of his Free-hold." DECLARATION, supra note 46, at 1-2.
Mounson further noted that an owner of property may put his land to productive use
subject to the condition that the use not harm anyone else: "The soyle is his owne ...
though it be his owne, he must so use it, that bee hurt not his Neighbour." Id. at 2-3. Wray
summarized the old rule when he said:
[Flor by the Common law, one shall not hurt the Freehold of another, and no
greater hurt, grievance, or dammage can be done to any mans Freehold, then
to take away the light and ayre thereof, which is comfortable & commodious
for him, for when this light, and ayre are taken from him, his house remaineth
as a dungeon.
Id. at 11.
9' Courts have made various disparaging comments on the doctrine. See, e.g., Auburn
& Cato Plank Rd. Co. v. Douglass, 9 N.Y. 444, 446 (1854) (doctrine only a moral precept
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case of Sedleigh-Denfield v. O'Callaghan,9" said of the sic utere tuo
rule:
This, like most maxims, is not only lacking in definiteness but is
also inaccurate. An occupier may make in many ways a use of
his land which causes damage to the neighboring landowners
and yet be free from liability.... Even where he is liable for a
nuisance, the redress may fall short of the damage .... 99
Wright failed to understand that the sic utere tuo doctrine was not
an isolated maxim meaning that all harms were actionable. It
meant that once the plaintiff had established actionable damages
(the necessity rule), no injury could be excused by balancing social
utilities (the sic utere tuo rule). 00 Modern English and American
courts forgot this compromise and its rationale.'
Blackstone, however, understood the sic utere tuo doctrine and
used William Aldred's Case as authority.10 2
[I]f one erects a smelting-house for lead so near the land of
another that the vapor and smoke kills his corn and grass, and
damages his cattle therein, this is held to be a nuisance.... [I]f
one does any other act, in itself lawful, which yet being done in
that place necessarily tends to the damage of another's prop-
erty, it is a nuisance: for it is incumbent on him to find some
other place to do that act where it will be less offensive.'0 3
The authoritativeness of Coke's Reports and Blackstone's Commen-
taries made the sic utere tuo rule almost unquestioned law in En-
gland and America for more than two hundred and fifty years
after William Aldred's Case.10 4
and "utterly useless as a legal maxim"); Brand v. Hammersmith & City Ry., L.R. 2 Q.B.
223, 247 (1867) (maxim is "no help to decision, as it cannot be applied till the decision is
made"); Bonomi v. Backhouse, El.B1.&El. 622, 643, 120 Eng. Rep. 643, 651 (Q.B.
1858) (maxim is "mere verbiage"), rev'd, El L.BJ.&E 11. 646, 120 Eng. Rep. 652 (Ex. Ch.
1859), aff'd, 9 H.L.C. 503, 11 Eng. Rep. 825 (1861).
98 [1940] A.C. 880.
99 Id. at 903.
110 See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
101 See notes 105-82 and accompanying text infra.
iog See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216-19.
103 Id. at *217-18.
104 Authorities generally accorded the rule respect. See, e.g., Tenant v. Goldwin, 2 Ld.
Raym. 1089, 1092, 92 Eng. Rep. 222, 224 (K.B. 1705) (Holt, C.J.) ("every one must so use
his own, as not to do damage to another"); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 470-72.
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II
THE BALANCING OF UTILITIES DOCTRINE AND
ST. HELEN'S SMELTING CO. V. TIPPING (1865)
The sic utere tuo rule prohibiting courts from balancing the
social utility of an alleged nuisance against the injury to the plain-
tiff was not seriously challenged in England until the middle of
the nineteenth century.' 0 5 A few American cases adopted a
balancing approach, but these decisions were not greatly influen-
tial.' 0 6 Indeed, some American jurisdictions retained the sic utere
tuo rule until as late as 1890.107 Yet today, the balancing of
utilities doctrine is found in nearly every American jurisdiction. 08
105 See M. HORWITZ, supra note 83, at 74-78; Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial
Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974). According to Brenner, the "case that introduced
the change" was Hole v. Barlow, 4 Com.B.(n.s.) 334, 140 Eng. Rep. 1113 (C.P. 1858).
Brenner, supra, at 410. Brenner expresses his indebtedness to Horwitz for the observation
that "[p]art of the decision's logic may have lain in the modern association of nuisance with
the action on the case, which was being transformed into an action for negligence." Id. at
411 & n.21a. According to Horwitz, it was only after St. Helen's Smelting "that the courts
began to acknowledge that a process of weighing utilities and not the mere existence of an
injury for deciding whether a particular use of land constituted a nuisance." M. HORWITZ,
supra note 83. at 75.
106 Horwitz cites Lexington & Ohio R.R. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289 (1839), as an
early example of a court balancing utilities. M. HoRwITz, supra note 83, at 74-75. But this
American case is not cited in 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 83, although St. Helen's
Smelting is so cited. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 83, § 1.24, at 72 n.34.
107 In that year, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated:
[The location of the fertilizer factory] may be convenient to the public, but, in
the eye of the law, no place can be convenient for the carrying on of a business
which is a nuisance, and which causes substantial injury to the property of
another. Nor can any use of one's own land be said to be a reasonable use,
which deprives an adjoining owner of the lawful use and enjoyment of his
property.
Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 277, 20 A. 900, 901 (1890). The court
refused to consider possible loss to the defendant's business.
The law, in cases of this kind, will not undertake to balance the conveniences,
or estimate the difference between the injury sustained by the plaintiff and the
loss that may result to the defendant from having its trade and business, as now
carried on, found to be a nuisance.
Id. at 282, 20 A. at 902.
108 See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 83, at 73-74; W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at
582, 596-602; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822 & Comments, 826 & Comment b,
827, 828 (1977). In deciding whether an action is a nuisance and whether it should be
enjoined, courts consider many factors. Those usually given the most weight in balancing
utilities are the social value of the interests involved, the suitability of the conduct to the
locality, and the relative hardship resulting from granting or denying an injunction. Id.
§§ 826, 936. The social value of the conduct is measured by its benefit to the public. Thus a
court may not enjoin the operations of a major defense plant (see, e.g., Pritchett v. Wade,
261 Ala. 156, 73 So. 2d 533 (1954); Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chemical Co., 130 Conn.
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The dominance of the balancing of utilities doctrine owes
much, both in England and America, to the authority of St.
Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping,10 9 the reputed origin of the balancing
of utilities rule." °  Although St. Helen's Smelting is cited fre-
quently in English cases"' and by eminent American au-
thorities 112 as establishing the balancing of utilities rule in the
common law doctrine of nuisance, these citations were apparently
485, 35 A.2d 845 (1944)) or an industry of great economic importance to the community
(see, e.g., Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 82 Idaho 263, 352 P.2d 235 (1960); Riter v. Keokuk
Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957)).
The factor most often considered decisive by the courts is probably the suitability of
the conduct to the locality. See Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82
N.W.2d 151 (1957) (factory in industrial district not enjoined); Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345
Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963) (piggery in residential neighborhood enjoined);
Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1974) (auto junkyard in residential neighbor-
hood enjoined). The Iowa court in Riter explained that:
[Tihe right of a person to pure air may be surrendered in part by his election
to live in a city where the atmosphere is impregnated with smoke, soot and
other impurities. These statements are especially applicable to one who elects to
live in or adjacent to an industrial district. Moreover, the operation of a lawful
industry which would be considered a nuisance in a residential section might
not be considered such when conducted in an industrial locality .... A fair test
as to whether the operation of such industry constitutes a nuisance has been
said to be the reasonableness of conducting it in the manner, at the place and
under the circumstances in question.
Id. at 721-22, 82 N.W.2d at 158.
The most potentially far-reaching grounds for denying an injunction are the economic
burdens placed on the defendant. See Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 82 Idaho 263, 352 P.2d
235 (1960); Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). The
strength and importance of this approach today is revealed in the leading case of Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). The
plaintiffs had suffered property damages in excess of $185,000, caused by dust from the
defendant's plant. The cement plant was worth $45,000,000 and employed over 300 work-
ers. In relegating the plaintiffs' relief to damages, the court overruled over 80 years of
precedent that, given a nuisance, had granted injunctions as a matter of right. The court
explained this departure from prior law when it stated that "[t]he ground for the denial of
injunction, notwithstanding the finding both that there is a nuisance and that plaintiffs have
been damaged substantially, is the large disparity in economic consequences of the nui-
sance and of the injunction." Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315. See
also Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del. E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
109 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865).
110 See J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 404 (5th ed. 1977); G. FRIDMAN, supra note 76, at
182-83; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 83, § 1.24, at 72 n.34; 3 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 595 n.b (12th ed. O.W. Holmes ed. 1873); H. STREET,
THE LAW OF TORTS 216-17, 226-27 (5th ed. 1972).
" See, e.g., Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co., [1961] 1 W.L.R. 683, 689-92 (Q.B.); Salvin v.
North Brancepeth Coal Co., [1874] L.R. 9 Ch. 705, 708-10 (Ch. App.); Crossley & Sons,
Ltd. v. Lightowler, L.R. 3 Eq. 277, 289 (V.C. 1866).
112 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES; supra note 83, § 1.24, at 72 n.34; 3 J. KENT, supra note 110,
at 595 n.b.
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made without a careful analysis of the precise holding or peculiar
circumstances of the case. Because the premises and value judg-
ments behind St. Helen's Smelting have remained largely
unexamined, the case bears fresh scrutiny.
A. Balancing of Utilities Doctrine as Dictum
in St. Helen's Smelting
William Tipping, the owner of Bold Hall Estate, brought the
action in August 1863.111 The plaintiff's pleaded declaration
paralleled William Aldred's complaint: the declaration was (1) an
action on the case for nuisance," 4 (2) the requested remedy was
damages for injury to the beneficial use of land and premises,115
and (3) the alleged injurious act was the release by the defendants
of "noxious vapours" which diffused on to the plaintiff's
neighboring land." 6 As in William Aldred's Case, the plaintiff ini-
tially brought the declaration before the local assizes court for
trial by jury."' Moreover, the House of Lords faced a similar
record on appeal: the jury had found for the plaintiff, the local
court had denied a motion for a new trial, and the trial court
granted leave to appeal on a point of law."'
The facts, however, reflected the passage of the centuries
since William Aldred's Case, centuries which included the Industrial
Revolution. The noxious fumes came not from pigs, but from a
major copper smelting works owned by the St. Helen's Smelting
Company." 9 The plaintiff's complaint did not focus on the
proximity of the defendants' operation, an important factor in
William Aldred's Case. In fact, the factory was one and a half miles
from the plaintiff's estate. 2 ° William Tipping was also a
different kind of plaintiff than William Aldred. Aldred apparently
owned a house and a small plot of land.' 21  Tipping owned a
'" 11 Eng. Rep. at 1483.
114 Id. Since the introduction of the famous Hilary rules of 1832, new judicial rules
written under legislative authority had regulated the main forms of action. However, the
final dissolution of the forms came only after the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873,
36 & 37 Vict., c. 66. As St. Helen's Smelting shows, courts and practitioners still thought in
terms of the old forms of action in 1863.
I'5 11 Eng. Rep. at 1483.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1483-84.
118 Id. at 1484. The Exchequer Chamber affirmed the jury instructions of Justice Mellor
before the defendants appealed to the House of Lords. Id.
119 Id. at 1483.
120 Id. at 1486.
121 9 Coke at 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 816.
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manor house and 1,300 acres, described by the judges as "an es-
tate of great value." 122 To Tipping, the awarded damages, £ 361
18s 4 1/2 d, were probably of little financial significance, especially
in light of the potential legal fees. 123  Tipping, however, was
wealthy enough to pursue economically unreasonable ends. The
apparent increase in the cost of legal proceedings between 1611
and 1863 for the average litigant 124 may be one reason why the
more modest plaintiffs of the nineteenth century would not usu-
ally challenge the Industrial Revolution in the high courts, but
would leave it to the Tippings.
The question of law on appeal in St. Helen's Smelting con-
cerned a special finding of fact required by the jury instructions
given at trial by Justice Mellor. Tipping testified that the vapors
from the smelting company extensively damaged his trees and
shrubs and bothered occupants on his estate. 25 The defense in-
troduced evidence that its copper works was in business at the
time Tipping purchased his property, and that several factories
operated in the area so that the defendants' factory did not neces-
sarily cause the damage. 12 6
With this evidence before the court, Justice Mellor directed
the jury that:
[Elvery man ... was bound to use his own property in such a
manner as not to injure the property of his neighbors; ... that the law
did not regard trifling inconveniences; that everything must be
looked at from a reasonable point of view; and therefore, in an
action for nuisance to property, arising from noxious vapours,
the injury to be actionable must be such as visibly to diminish the
value of the property and the comfort and enjoyment of it .... [Ilt was
122 1 Eng. Rep. at 1483, 1486.
122 Id. at 1484. Two years passed between the trial and final disposition on appeal. Id. at
1483. Furthermore, for the appeal, Tipping hired at least four lawyers. Three barristers'
names appeared in the record. 11 Eng. Rep. at 1486. In addition, Tipping needed at least
one solicitor, because only a solicitor could engage a barrister for a client. St. Helen's
Smelting Company had hired the Attorney-General as their barrister. 11 Eng. Rep. at
1484.
124 The cost of legal proceedings appears to have risen significantly over this period,
although a scientific study has not been done. See H. KIRK, PORTRAIT OF A PROFESSION
155-67 (1976); R. ROBSON, THE ATrORNEY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 28, 41-42
(1959); Prest, Counsellors' Fees and Earnings in the Age of Sir Edward Coke, LEGAL RECORDS
AND THE HISTORIAN 165, 174-75 (J. Baker ed. 1978) (fees and earnings for lawyers in
Coke's day uncertain and modest). One of the causes was the abolition of local courts in
many areas. See B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS 12-14 (1967).
12 11 Eng. Rep. at 1483, 1484.
126 Id. at 1484.
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clear that in counties where great works had been erected ...
persons must not stand on their extreme rights ... for if so, the
business of the whole country would be seriously interfered
with.12 7
Justice Mellor's direction essentially restated the law applied in
William Aldred's Case. He reiterated the sic utere tuo doctrine of in-
jury while limiting damages to what Lord Coke might have called
"things of necessity." Yet Justice Mellor's emphasis on concerns
over "reasonableness," standing on "extreme rights," and interfer-
ence with "the business of the whole country" suggests a new judi-
cial mood, a new willingness to compromise absolute principles.
The jury then answered three questions in a special verdict.
The learned judge ... did ask the jury whether the enjoyment
of the Plaintiff's property was sensibly diminished, and the
answer was in the affirmative. Whether the business there car-
ried on was an ordinary business for smelting copper, and the
answer was, "We consider it an ordinary business, and con-
ducted in a proper manner, in as good a manner as possible."
But to the question whether the jurors thought that it was car-
ried on in a proper place, the answer was "We do not." 128
The trial court entered judgment, with damages, for Tipping.
The defendants unsuccessfully appealed to the Exchequer
Chamber, alleging that Justice Mellor had incorrectly instructed
the jury, 29 and then sought review in the House of Lords on
identical grounds.13 0
The defendants' argument on appeal was simple: the court
had misinstructed the jury by failing to instruct that, when a
neighborhood is "denaturalised" by industry, "a person who
comes into that neighbourhood cannot complain that what was
done before he came there is continued."131 In so arguing, the
defendants cited Hole v. Barlow,'3 2 a lower court case, in which
Justice Willes had said:
127 Id. (emphasis added).
128 Id.
129 Id. In 1865, the Exchequer Chamber was an appellate court and consisted of at least
five judges from the Common Pleas and the Exchequer. See 1 Jowrrr's DICTIONARY OF
ENGLISH LAW 738-39 (2d ed. 1977). It heard important appeals from the Assize Courts
regarding alleged errors of law. See Law Terms Act, 1830, 1 Will. 4, c. 70, § 8. Appeal lay
directly to the House of Lords. The court was abolished by the Supreme Court of Judica-
ture Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, pt. 2, § 18(4).
110 11 Eng. Rep. at 1484.
131 Id. at 1485.
12 4 Com.B.(n.s.) 334, 140 Eng. Rep. 1113 (C.P. 1858).
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The common-law right which every proprietor of a dwelling-
house has to have the air uncontaminated and unpolluted, is
subject to this qualification, that necessities may arise for an in-
terference with that right pro bono publico, to this extent, that
such interference be in respect of a matter essential to the busi-
ness of life, and be conducted in a reasonable and proper man-
ner, and in a reasonable and proper place. 133
According to the defendants, because the jury found that the
smelting company conducted its business in "as good a manner as
possible," the court should have asked the jury whether the sur-
rounding neighborhood had been "denaturalised.;' By failing to
submit such a question to the jury, the defendants argued that the
court committed reversible error.1
3 4
The House of Lords, recognizing the importance of the case,
had requested the presence of six "learned judges" from the
lower courts. 1 35  After hearing the defendants' argument, Lord
Chancellor Westbury asked the judges if they wished to hear
further argument, including that of Tipping's counsel, or if they
were ready to answer the Lords' questions regarding the correct-
ness of the jury instructions. 1 3 6  The experts and the Lords
agreed that the argument for the Uefendants misstated the law,
and that the lower court decision should be upheld. 1 37
This was the true holding of St. Helen's Smelting. The case
explicitly rejected the balancing of utilities doctrine argued by the
defendants on appeal. The House of Lords upheld a direction to
the jury which, apart from Justice Mellor's casual remarks about
standing on "extreme rights," essentially restated the sic utere tuo
test of William Aldred's Case. 138  Undoubtedly, William Aldred's Case
remained uncited on appeal only because the defendants' lawyers
alone submitted argument; the House of Lords did not call for
argument by the plaintiff's lawyers.' 39
133 Id. at 345, 140 Eng. Rep. at 1118.
134 11 Eng. Rep. at 1485-86.
135 They were Baron Martin, Justice Willes, Justice Blackburn, Justice Keating, Baron
Pigott, and Justice Shee. Id. at 1484.
136 Id. at 1486.
137 Id.
138 See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
139 The result of St. Helen's Smelting disfavored industrial polluters in another way. At
trial, defendants' counsel argued that it was impossible to tell how much of the damage to
plaintiff's property was caused by its fumes, rather than by fumes produced by other
neighboring factories. 11 Eng. Rep. at 1484. Justice Mellor, however, did not instruct the
jury to determine how much of the damage was caused by the defendants' plant. Rather he
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Many leading authorities have mistakenly cited St. Helen's
Smelting as supporting the balancing of utilities doctrine,1 40
apparently because of the confusing dicta of the case. Lord
Westbury was partly to blame for this confusion. He accurately
paraphrased the sic utere tuo rule and the de minimis limits to
damage-found both in Justice Mellor's directions and in William
Aldred's Case-when he summarized the grounds for the decision
in St. Helen's Smelting:
[Tihe jurors have found the existence of the injury; and the
only ground upon which your Lordships are asked to set aside
that verdict, and to direct a new trial, is this, that the whole
neighbourhood where these copper smelting works were car-
ried on, is a neighbourhood more or less devoted to manufac-
turing purposes ... and therefore it is said, that inasmuch as
this copper smelting is carried on in what the Appellant con-
tends is a fit place, it may be carried on with impunity,
although the result may be the utter destruction, or the very
considerable diminution, of the value of the Plaintiff's prop-
erty.... I apprehend that that is not the meaning of the word
"suitable," or the meaning of the word "convenient," which has
been used as applicable to the subject. The word "suitable" un-
questionably cannot carry with it this consequence, that a trade
may be carried on in a particular locality, the consequence of
which trade may be injury and destruction to the neighbouring
property. Of course ... I except cases where any prescriptive
right has been acquired by a lengthened user of the place.1 41
only asked the jury if the use of the plaintiff's land was "sensibly diminished" (I 1 Eng.
Rep. at 1485, 1488), or in the words of an unofficial account of the case, he only required
that "the effect of the noxious vapors to a sensible extent can be traced to have come from
the [defendants'] works" (12 L.T.R.(n.s.) at 777). The court thus did not force the plaintiff
to show "a basis for apportionment of the damage among the various causative factors" as
a prerequisite for recovery. See generally Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology
Assessment, 38 U. GIN. L. REv. 587, 619 (1969). Once the St. Helen's Smelting jury had found
some substantive damage caused by the defendant, it was allowed to assess the amount of
damages at its own discretion. The plaintiff apparently satisfied his burden of proof as to
causation simply by showing that the defendants' plant produced a significant amount of
"vapors" and that the winds commonly blew them across the plaintiff's land. 11 Eng. Rep.
at 1183-84. This rule is in harmony with one recent scholarly suggestion. See Katz, supra, at
618. Cf Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (application of similar
standard of proof of causation to negligence action). This rule essentially forces a defen-
dant to demonstrate the presence of contributory causes once a plaintiff has shown some
causation related to that defendant. See Katz, supra, at 618-20. These rules, if followed
today, could significantly aid plaintiffs in pollution cases. See id.
140 See notes 110-12 and accompanying text supra.
4I 11 Eng. Rep. at 1487. Lord Westbury's assumption that prescriptive use can legalize
a nuisance marks a significant change in nuisance law from the days of the Year Books. See
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But Lord Westbury then introduced, as pure dictum, a new rule
for claims of injury only amounting to mere sensible personal dis-
comfort. 142  He essentially stated that personal sensibilities could
never constitute strictly protected "natural rights" of seisin, but
could be subjected to a balancing of utilities by courts. This qual-
ification severely restricted the necessity test of William Aldred's
Case, which protected such "personal sensibilities" as sensibility to
foul smell.
Lord Wensleydale, in his opinion, did not discuss this distinc-
tion between personal sensibilities and material damage. He sim-
ply voiced his agreement with the decision below, and quoted Jus-
tice Mellor's direction that "the law does not regard trifling and
small inconveniences, but only regards sensible inconveniences, in-
juries which sensibly diminish the comfort, enjoyment, or value of
the property which is affected." 143 This was the old and ac-
cepted de minimis rule which Justice Mellor emphasized when he
said that business could not survive if everyone stood on "extreme
rights." 144 But Justice Mellor's directions to the jury were consis-
tent with the necessity test set forth in William Aldred's Case. He
did not advocate a balancing of utilities rule for either material
damage to property or significant discomfort to the senses.
Lord Cranworth's opinion is more ambiguous. He stated that
Justice Mellor "could [not] ... have stated the law . . . better than
he has done in this case." 145  Yet he gave a now famous example
of an unreported case which he may have intended to support a
balancing of utilities test.
note 43 and accompanying text supra (no easement of "foul smell" obtainable over
another's land). According to Simpson, the law of property on this issue was, at some
point, confused with the law of torts. A. SIMPSON, supra note 41, at 246.
142 Lord Westbury stated that:
With regard to ... personal inconvenience and interference with one's enjoy-
ment, one's quiet, one's personal freedom, anything that discomposes or injuri-
ously affects the senses or the nerves, whether that may or may not be denomi-
nated a nuisance, must undoubtedly depend greatly on the circumstances of the
place where the thing complained of actually occurs. If a man lives in a town, it
is necessary that he should subject himself to the consequences of those opera-
tions of trade which may be carried on in his immediate locality, which are
actually necessary for trade and commerce, and also for the enjoyment of
property, and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town and of the public at
large.... But when an occupation ... [causes] a material injury to property,
then there unquestionably arises a very different consideration.
11 Eng. Rep. at 1486.
143 Id. at 1488.
141 Id. at 1484.
145 Id. at 1487.
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[T]here was an action for injury arising from smoke in the
town of Shields. It was proved incontestibly that smoke did
come and in some degree interfere with a certain person; but I
said, "You must look at it not with a view to the question
whether, abstractedly, that quantity of smoke was a nuisance,
but whether it was a nuisance to a person living in the town of
Shields;" because, if it only added in an infinitesimal degree to
the quantity of smoke, I held that the state of the town
rendered it altogether impossible to call that an actionable nui-
sance.
1 4 6
It is not clear whether Lord Cranworth found for the defendant
in that unreported case because of: (1) the balancing of utilities
doctrine, (2) a de minimis amount of damage caused by the de-
fendants' acts, or (3) the difficulty in allocation of damages.' 47
Lord Cranworth did not explain why the "state of the town" made
it "altogether impossible" to find an actionable nuisance. Only the
de minimis defense was consistent with the terms of Justice Mel-
lor's jury instructions, which Lord Cranworth voted to uphold.' 4 8
Lord Cranworth never mentioned Lord Westbury's distinc-
tion between "personal sensibility" and "material injury." Only by
making that distinction could Lord Westbury uphold the jury di-
rection in the case at hand, while advocating a balancing of
utilities doctrine for different situations. Since Lord Cranworth's
opinion lacked this distinction, his approval of Justice Mellor's in-
structions gives no support to a balancing of utilities doctrine.
Thus, the balancing of utilities doctrine, for which St. Helen's
Smelting is considered "authority," was:
146 Id.
147 For a discussion of the problem posed by "a defendant whose conduct by itself would
cause too slight an interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property to
amount to nuisance, but whose conduct in fact combines with that of others to constitute a
nuisance," see Katz, supra note 139, at 618 n.66; W. PROSSER, supra note 21, §§ 52, 91, at
322-23, 607-08.
148 See notes 127-39 and accompanying text supra. But in Lord Cranworth's day, many
courts refused to recognize the de minimis defense for acts harmless on an individual basis
when it was clear that the product or conduct of the defendant combined with others to
produce a nuisance. See, e.g., Hill v. Smith, 32 Cal. 166, 167-68 (1867) (where defendant
contributed to pollution of stream, no defense that his acts alone did not cause material
injury); Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 1, 9-10 (1881) (defendant-butcher liable for dump-
ing blood into stream, even if his acts were only minor contribution to nuisance); Francis v.
Alexander Cowan & Sons, (1866] 5 M. 214, 228-29 (Sess.) (each defendant who materially
contributes to pollution of stream liable for nuisance created by all); Lambton v. Mellish,
[1894 3 Ch. 163 (where two or more persons make enough noise to create a nuisance,
each individually liable for entire nuisance); W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 52, at 322-23;
Katz, supra note 139, at 618 n.66.
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(1) clearly advocated by only one judge out of three;
(2) restricted even by thatjudge to "personal sensibilities" with a
strict sic utere tuo rule retained for "material injury" to
property;
(3) not a basis for the decision in the case, because material
injury to property was involved; and
(4) absent from the lower court's jury instructions which all
three Lords upheld.
In short, the holding of St. Helen's Smelting is not precedent for a
balancing of utilities doctrine. Except for Lord Westbury's dictum
and Lord Cranworth's ambiguous remarks, all of the opinions
were clearly consistent with William Aldred's Case. Had Tipping's
victorious lawyers presented their case, they undoubtedly would
have pressed for a ringing and explicit reaffirmance of the sic
utere tuo rule. But even without such a reaffirmance, St. Helen's
Smelting did not bury the old rule.
B. Assessing the Balancing of Utilities Doctrine
St. Helen's Smelting was the last major House of Lords case to
face directly the balancing of utilities issue. Its true holding re-
mains the law of England.' 49 In 1961, however, in Halsey v. Esso
Petroleum Co.,' 50 an English court again treated Lord Westbury's
dictum as if it were the holding of St. Helen's Smelting.15' This
suggests that there might be merit, quite apart from authority, in
Lord Westbury's doctrine. But serious analysis can also lead to the
conclusion that Lord Westbury's balancing of utilities test reflected
social values unacceptable in a modern democracy, and that Lord
Westbury's doctrine, in practice, has protected the sensibilities of
the wealthy Tippings of the world, while condemning the poor to
damned cities like Lord Cranworth's Shields.
The unfairness of Lord Westbury's doctrine becomes clear
when contrasted with William Aldred's Case. The sic utere tuo rule,
unlike the balancing of utilities doctrine, assured the little man
that he had inalienable rights of property. While these rights did
14 See CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 82, 1433, at 809.
150 [19611 1 W.L.R. 683 (Q.B.).
"I Id. at 689-90. In holding the defendants liable, the court applied Lord Westbury's
distinction between injury to property and damage to personal sensibilities. Id. at 691. In
considering the issue of liability, the court considered the character of the neighborhood
and balanced the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant. Id. at 691-93. Balancing, how-
ever, played no role in the court's computation of damages following its finding of liability.
Id. at 702-03.
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not include protection from every inconvenience to use of prop-
erty, they did extend to those things necessary for a decent exis-
tence on his property. Such necessities included not only the in-
tegrity of his physical premises, but of his basic sensibilities as
well. Under the traditional common law sic utere tuo doctrine, a
man with some stake in property, even just a lease, had individual
rights which neither big industrial users nor pig keepers could
violate without lawful compensation.
This old common law doctrine was decent and humane com-
pared to the hardened attitudes of the nineteenth century. The
balancing of utilities doctrine advocated by Lord Westbury per-
mitted the industrial user to externalize the costs of his pollution.
Such a legal doctrine offered no economic incentive for the active
user of property to develop technology that would prevent such
side effects. This doctrine, combined with the inaccessibility and
cost of legal remedy," left industry free to ravage the northern
English cities, including Tipping's Liverpool.'5 2 It was an unjust
way of forcing public investment in industrial growth, regardless
of how desirable that investment might have seemed.
C. Return of the Sic Utere Tuo Rule
The balancing of utilities doctrine remains the established law
in America. 153 But there have been faint signs of a return to the
sic utere tuo rule. In Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co.,' 54 the North
Carolina Supreme Court confronted a situation similar to those in
William Aldred's Case and St. Helen's Smelting. The defendant's re-
finery emitted "noxious gases and odors," which restricted the use
of the plaintiff's land.155  The defendant argued that it operated
a lawful, socially useful enterprise which should not be subject to
liability if "operated properly." 156
Judge Ervin, writing for the court, rejected the defendant's
argument of social utility and supported his decision with the an-
cient doctrine.
152 The placement of liability for pollution and other social costs will influence wealth
distribution and allocational efficiency. See Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of
Law, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AsF. 3 (1975); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1093-96 (1972).
Horwitz emphasized this point in his analysis of American legal history. See Introduction to
M. HORWITZ, supra note 83, at xvi-xvii.
153 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 828-31 (1977); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 83, § 1.25, at 75.
154 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953).
155 Id. at 194-95, 77 S.E.2d at 690.
156 Id. at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687.
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The law of private nuisance rests on the concept embodied
in the ancient legal maxim Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
meaning, in essence, that every person should so use his own
property as not to injure that of another.... As a consequence,
a private nuisance exists in a legal sense when one makes an
improper use of his own property and in that way injures the
land or some incorporeal right of one's neighbor....
... [Alny substantial non-trespassory invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type of
liability forming conduct is a private nuisance.15 7
Judge Ervin qualified this accurate restatement of the sic utere
tuc doctrine by adding a "reasonableness" test:
[T]he invasion which subjects a person to liability for private
nuisance may be either intentional or unintentional; ... 2t per-
son is subject to liability for an intentional invasion when his
conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances of the particu-
lar case; and . .. a person is subject to liability for an uninten-
tional invasion when his conduct is negligent, reckless or ul-
trahazardous. 15s
Judge Ervin never clarified this reasonableness test. Although it
might merely be a disguised balancing of utilities test, it could also
comprise a modern version of Coke's doctrine. Coke limited liabil-
ity to circumstances where the defendant's actions damaged things
of necessity.' 5 9 Whether a nuisance was actionable turned on the
presence of such damage. Judge Ervin's statements in Morgan
could support a similar test which focuses, not on the social utility
of the defendant's activities, but rather on the nature of the de-
fendant's interference with his neighbor's property. Under such a
test, any act that damages a thing of necessity to a neighbor would
be unreasonable and comprise an actionable nuisance.
Judge Ervin also encountered a pitfall unique to American
nuisance law-a requirement of negligent or intentional dam-
age.160  English courts never required fault for nuisances because
157 Id. at 193, 77 S.E.2d at 689.
158 Id., 77 S.E.2d at 689.
1'9 See notes 68-77 and accompanying text supra.
160 See generally note 83 and accompanying text supra. In addition to a possible misun-
derstanding of the imported English pleadings (see note 83 and accompanying text supra),
the American requirement of fault may have arisen because of a desire to promote indus-
try in the nineteenth century (see M. HORWITZ, supra note 83, at 74-78, 102), or the influ-
ence of Bentham's concepts of individualism (see R. POUND, T-E FORMATIVE ERA OF
AMERICAzi LAW 50-57 (1938)) or a combination of these factors.
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they historically used nuisance law to allocate property rights be-
tween two persons engaged in lawful pursuits.16' The American
requirement of fault ignored the history of and the rationale for
nuisance as a distinct action. Trespass or negligence can redress
intentional or negligent injuries to property. 162  To retain a sepa-
rate function, nuisance must offer specific guidelines of property
protection when all of the conflicting parties are acting in good
faith and with reasonable care.'
63
Judge Ervin attempted to solve this problem by eliminating
the fault test from intentional nuisance, and then defining "inten-
tional" so broadly as to cover almost any continuous invasion of
property rights.
An invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment
of land is intentional in the law of private nuisance when the
person whose conduct is in question as a basis for liability acts
for the purpose of causing it, or knows that it is resulting from
his conduct, or knows that it is substantially certain to result
from his conduct.... A person who intentionally creates or
maintains a private nuisance is liable for the resulting injury to
others regardless of the degree of care or skill exercised by him
to avoid such injury. 164
His formulation minimizes the role of fault when private owner-
ship interests conflict.' 6 5 Judge Ervin chose this course because
only a sic utere tuo standard, based objectively on the type and
degree of property interference, avoids arbitrariness where one
legitimate business conflicts with the operation of another legiti-
mate business. In such cases, the judge's discretion should be lim-
161 CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 82, 1393-94, at 781-84. English courts originally
adopted this position because the assize of nuisance was fully developed as a legal remedy
long before fault first began to appear as a requirement in any part of the law including
trespass to the person. See Weaver v. Ward, I Hob. 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616); W.
PROSSER, supra note 21, § 29, at 141-42; W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 5 (6th ed. 1976).
162 All that would be required is an extension of trespass to include intangible invasions
as well as tangible physical invasions. See generally I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 83,
§ 1.23, at 67.
163 See generally C. HAAR, supra note 19, at 124-25; Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning
Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 440.
164 238 N.C. at 194, 77 S.E.2d at 689. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825
(1977).
165 In addition, Judge Ervin classified some nuisances as actionable per se even without
proof of damages to things of necessity. 238 N.C. at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687. His classifica-
tion extends to only a few public nuisances, such as houses of prostitution. See Tedescki v.
Berger, 150 Ala. 649, 43 So. 960 (1907).
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ited to the question of substantial damage to things of necessity.
This limitation gives precision to Judge Ervin's otherwise circular
definition. This reading also coincides with the clear historical
meaning of the sic utere tuo doctrine which Judge Ervin cites as his
authority.
Such a rule leaves the defendant with several options after a
court finds that a nuisance exists. He can, unless the court issues
an injunction, continue his operations following payment of dam-
ages. 166  He can, in any event, buy the plaintiff's property or ac-
quire the plaintiff's permission to continue his operations. He can
always move elsewhere. If a plaintiff demands too great a price
and the defendant does not wish to move, he may request emi-
nent domain power from the legislature. 167 But the defendant
"6 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d
312 (1970) (where defendant has investment of over $45,000,000, employs over 300 per-
sons, and cannot correct dust pollution, injunction will be stayed upon payment of perma-
nent damages).
167 Many nuisances are active, continuing interferences with land use. The wrong con-
tinues day-to-day. That earlier tortfeasors may have avoided the cost of such active inter-
ference with property use is no reason why the present victim should have no remedy at
all, at least for continuing physical interferences with property. This is particularly true
because, by the historical development of delegated eminent domain powers, passive prop-
erty users may be forced to sell out to a socially important, private enterprise at a "fair
price" if a legislature agrees, and if the price can survive a court challenge. See Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527
(1906). See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Scheiber, The Road
to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSPECTIVES
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329 (1971); Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings
in Nineteenth Century America, 40 U, Cm. L. REv. 854 (1973). Cf. M. HoRwrrz, supra note
83, at 63-66 (eminent domain power used to promote cheap economic development prior
to the establishment of the principle of fair compensation). In determining this price, ac-
tual purchase prices are always considered, although other factors, including the owner's
rights to prevent wrongful interferences with his property, are also considered.
The ultimate evil of a deprivation of property, or better, a frustration of prop-
erty rights ... is that it forces the owner to assume the cost of providing a
benefit to the public without recoupment. There is no attempt to share the cost
of the benefit among those benefited, that is, society at large. Instead, the acci-
dent of ownership determines who shall bear the cost initially. Of course, as
further consequence, the ultimate economic cost of providing the benefit is
hidden from those who in a democratic society are given the power of deciding
whether or not they wish to obtain the benefit despite the ultimate economic
cost, however initially distributed.... When [the cost is) successfully concealed,
the public is not likely to have objection to the "cost-free" benefit.
Fred. F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 596-97, 350 N.E.2d
381, 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11 (1976) (citation omitted).
With appropriate "fair price" safeguards, windfall profits will be uncommon. For a
discussion of windfall profits, see Comment, Internalizing Externalities: Nuisance Law and
Economic Efficiency, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 219, 230 (1978). What is unacceptable is de facto
expropriation of property rights without any attempt to compensate or to obtain legislative
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cannot substantially deprive other property owners of things
necessary to the enjoyment of their land without compensation.
The sic utere tuo rule assures the passive property owner that
changes in surrounding land and environment, including those
that are beyond his control will not erode his rights. Before St.
Helen's Smelting, all property owners, including small leaseholders,
possessed such rights. Even accepting Lord Westbury's dictum as
to personal sensibility, this position remains good law in England
when material damage to property occurs.1 68
D. Extension of the Balancing of Utilities Doctrine
The common misunderstanding of the St. Helen's Smelting
holding may be extended further. Professor Street has implied
that nuisance law requires a balancing of utilities even for cases of
physical injury.' 6 9  Street observed that the other judges in St.
Helen's Smelting did not support Westbury's dictum distinguishing be-
tween physical injuries and harms to only the sensibilities. 1 70
From this lack of support Street draws his conclusion that a
balancing test was meant to apply to both. types of damages. A
more logical conclusion, however, is that the majority favored the
old sic utere tuo rule. Moreover, Street's analysis is contradicted by
the words of the other judges,'171 and is also entirely inconsistent
with Justice Mellor's directions to the jury, 172 the very directions
the Lords approved.' 73  In addition, none of the lords or judges,
except Lord Westbury in his isolated dictum concerning personal
sensibility, 174 indicated that he was modifying prior doctrine--a
approval; that is a legacy inherent in the "balancing of utilities." Legal tests turning on
economic welfare maximization are legacies that favor "the claimant of the right whose use
is productive over one whose use is consumptive" and "the rich claimant whose use is
consumptive over the poor claimant whose use is consumptive." Baker, supra note 152, at 9
(emphasis omitted). For extensive discussions, see Rice, Pollution as a Nuisance: Problems,
Prospects, and Proposals, 34 J. AM. TIAL LAW. A. 202 (1972); Note, Nuisance Damages as an
Alternative to Compensation of Land Use Restrictions in Eminent Domain, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 998
(1974); Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1969); Note,
The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. Rav. 383 (1969); Michelman, Book
Review, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971).
168 See Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co., [1961] 1 W.L.R. 683, 691 (Q.B.); CLERK &
LINDSELL, supra note 82, 1394, at 783-84.
169 H. STREET, supra note 110, at 221-27.
170 Id. at 226.
171 See text accompanying notes 143-46 supra.
172 See text accompanying note 128 supra.
173 See text accompanying notes 127-39 supra.
174 See text accompanying note 142 supra.
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course of conduct that normally accompanies a major change in
the law, such as the introduction of a balancing of utilities test to
nineteenth century England. 175  Extending the balancing test
would not only frustrate the true holding of St. Helen's Smelting,
but also would ignore the long and rational development of the sic
utere tuo doctrine.
E. Future of the Sic Utere Tuo Rule
In light of the predominance of the balancing of utilities test,
the future of the sic utere tuo rule seems dim. 76 Although William
Aldred's Case is still widely cited, courts often focus on its limitation
of damage to things of necessity, and ignore its most important
holding-its refusal to balance utilities.17 7  This unwarranted re-
jection of the sic utere tuo rule shows an unwillingness to go behind
the confusion of St. Helen's Smelting and reconsider afresh the
'T See text accompanying notes 143-48 supra.
'6 Indeed, the spirit of Lord Cranworth's Shields, the "denaturalised" neighborhood,
lives on. Thus in Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957),
the court stated:
Many authorities point out that the right of a person to pure air may be
surrendered in part by his election to live in a city where the atmosphere is
impregnated with smoke, soot and other impurities. These statements are espe-
cially applicable to one who elects to live in or adjacent to an industrial district.
Moreover, the operation of a lawful industry which would be considered a nui-
sance in a residential section might not be considered such when conducted in
an industrial locality.
Id. at 721, 82 N.W.2d at 158.
1'77 See, e.g., J. FLEMING, supra note 110, at 400 & n.6, 592 & n.20. But see CLERK &
LINDSELL, supra note 82, V 1434, at 809 & n.34. William Aldred's Case is also cited widely for
the proposition that an odor can constitute a nuisance. See CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note
82, 1393, 1402, at 783 & n.21, 788 & n.59; I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 83, §
1.26, at 78; W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 89, at 592 & n.22.
Unfortunately, many modern courts have exhibited only a very general understanding
of the sic utere tuo principle. Often courts mention it in support of a duty to exercise
ordinary care. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Thompson, 381 S.W.2d 536 (Ky. 1964)
(duty to use ordinary care in performance of any dangerous act which might endanger
others); Hayes v. Malkan, 26 N.Y.2d 295, 258 N.E.2d 695, 310 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970) (dis-
senting opinion, Fuld, C.J.) (duty to use reasonable care prohibits utility from placing util-
ity pole dangerously close to highway). One court has stretched the maxim's concept of
responsibility to others so far as to find that it contains the basis for no-fault insurance
legislation. See Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978).
Another court has extended the meaning of the maxim even further in using it to support
the notion that a property owner does not have the right to prevent entry on to his land by
an entrant seeking to contact the owner's employees for their benefit. See State v. Shack, 58
N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). Such loose uses of the maxim only confuse the law. Used as
a general rule, the maxim is nearly devoid of content. The sic utere tuo doctrine's fullest
utility can be realized only if courts understand that its meaning is largely tied to its histor-
ical context and origins.
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merits of the original doctrine. Only within the context of William
Aldred's Case does the sic utere tuo doctrine become more than an
empty maxim.
More courts faced with cases like Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co.
should give the experience of their own past a fair hearing. 17 8
They would do well to compare the wise formula set forth in Wil-
liam Aldred's Case179 with the unspoken economic assumptions of
17'8 The requirement of damage to things of necessity combines objectivity with limited
judicial discretion. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra. In Walter v. Selfe, 4 De G.
& Sm. 315, 64 Eng. Rep. 849 (Ch. 1851), Vice Chancellor Bruce described the standard:
[TIhis inconvenience [ought] to be considered in fact as more than fanciful,
more than one of mere delicacy of fastidiousness, as an inconvenience mate-
rially interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not
merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according
to plain and sober and simple notions among the English people?
Id. at 322, 64 Eng. Rep. at 852. Accord, Fleming v. Hislop, 11 App. Cas. 686, 691, 697
(1886).
179 Indeed some jurisdictions explicitly reject the balancing of utilities test. See, Jost v.
Dairyland Power Coop., 45 Wis.2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969).
While there are some jurisdictions that permit the balancing of the utility
of the offending conduct against the gravity of the injury inflicted, it is clear
that the rule, permitting such balancing, is not approved in Wisconsin where
the action is for damages. We said in Pennoyer v. Allen... :
"When such comfort and enjoyment are so impaired, and compensation is
demanded, it is no defense to show that such business was conducted in a
reasonable and proper manner, and with more than ordinary cleanliness, and
that the odors so sent over and upon such adjacent premises were only such as
were incident to the business when properly conducted. It is the interruption of
such enjoyment and the destruction of such comfort that furnishes the ground
of action, and it is no satisfaction to the injured party to be informed that it
might have been done with more aggravation. The business is lawful; but such
interruption and destruction is an invasion of private rights, and to that extent
unlawful. It is not so much the manner of doing as the proximity of such a
business to the adjacent occupant which causes the annoyance. A business
necessarily contaminating the atmosphere to the extent indicated should be lo-
cated where it will not necessarily deprive others of the enjoyment of their
property, or lessen their comfort while occupying the same."
In Dolata v. Berthelet Fuel & Supply Co ... , relying on Pennoyer, this
court concluded that even though a coal yard was operated properly, neverthe-
less, it, a socially and economically useful business, would be abated if it caused
substantial damage to the adjoining plaintiff.
Id. at 174, 172 N.W.2d at 652 (citations omitted). TheJost court continued:
We adhere to the rule of Pennoyer v. Allen. Although written in 1883, we
believe it remains completely applicable under modern conditions. We conclude
that injuries caused by air pollution or other nuisance must be compensated
irrespective of the utility of the offending conduct as compared to the injury.
Nor do we imply that a different rule should apply where the remedy sought is
abatement rather than damages. That point is not considered herein. We con-
sider that the rule of Dolata continues to be the law in Wisconsin where the
action is for abatement.
Id. at 177, 172 N.W.2d at 654.
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the balancing of utilities doctrine. The sic utere tuo doctrine has
never had a record of obstructing economic growth. 8 ° Further-
more, the judicial discretion favored by the balancing of utilities
doctrine has the potential of being equally obstructionist and, in
certain instances, has actually been used to block socially desirable
developments solely on aesthetic or psychological grounds. 8 '
Balancing utilities gives the courts too much discretion to evade
the democratic process and principles of fair compensation. The
rule in William Aldred's Case most fully protects these values, while
encouraging economic rationality. 82
III
THE RES COMMUNES DOCTRINE: ILLINOIS
CENTRAL RAILROAD V. ILLINOIS (1892)
The greatest historical limit on the sic utere tuo rule's opera-
tion has been the requirement that the plaintiff possess an injured
private real property interest.' 83 This prerequisite severely cur-
tails the doctrine's modern utility.'84 Many persons have no in-
180 Rather, it has never been given a fair trial in modern society. "Only in the twentieth
century did official and formal nuisance doctrine incorporate a balancing test." M.
HoRwrrz, supra note 83, at 293 n.73. But, as Horwitz points out, the sic utere tuo doc-
trine was substantially evaded earlier, leaving the question of its true effects, if rigorously
applied, unanswered and unanswerable. See id. at 74-78. See also Brenner, Nuisance Law and
the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 431-33 (1974); Kurtz, Nineteenth Century
Anti-Enterpreneurial Nuisance Injunctions-Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv.
621, 670 (1976); Laitos, The Social and Economic Roots of Judge-Made Air Pollution Policy in
Wisconsin, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 465, 466-74, 514-15 (1975).
"'t See Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910) (injunction granted against
tuberculosis sanitarium which depressed land values); Managers of the Metro. Asylum Dist.
v. Hill, 6 App. Cas. 193 (1881) (injunction granted against hospital for smallpox and other
contagious diseases). But see Shuttleworth v. Vancouver Gen. Hosp., [1927] 2 D.L.R. 573
(Can.) (damages denied landowner near hospital even though presence of communicable
diseases decreased land values).
182 See note 167 supra.
183 See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
's It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the limitations of modern private
nuisance doctrine. A substantial body of literature on the subject exists. See, e.g., Chaffee,
supra note 35, at 394-400; Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Convenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973); Juergensmeyer, Control of Air
Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126; Katz, supra note 139,
at 606-22, 641-45; Laitos, The Social and Economic Roots of Judge-Made Air Pollution Policy in
Wisconsin, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 465 (1975); Larremore, Public Aesthetics, 20 HARV. L. RaV. 35,
40-45 (1906); McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land, 37 HARV. L. REv. 574
(1924); Newark, supra note 19, at 485-90; Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage
Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 17, 24-26 (1966); Rice, supra note
167; Warren, Nuisance Law as an Environmental Tool, 7 WAKE FORxsT L. Rav. 211 (1971);
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terest in real property other than short term leases, and almost
everyone spends considerable time at work or leisure away from
his property in which he has an interest. Traditional private nui-
sance law offers no protection in these situations. Furthermore,
the alternative tort doctrines-negligence, public nuisance, tres-
pass, and the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher-cannot by themselves
protect against all wrongful infliction of injury through the use of
property, particularly by air and water pollution. a 5 But a fifth
common law doctrine can assist private citizens in solving these
problems, and that is the ancient property law doctrine of res
communes.
The res communes doctrine provides that some forms of prop-
erty are legally incapable of exclusive ownership. Instead, the
commonalty'1 6-the people collectively--own them. Such owner-
Winfield, supra note 39 (private nuisance, negligence, and trespass compared and con-
trasted); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 517-24 (1957)
(limitation on damages as remedy); Note, Nuisance Damages as an Alternative to Compensation
of Land Use Restrictions in Eminent Domain, 47 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 998 (1974).
185 Negligence, of course, requires proof of carelessness (see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 83, § 16.1, at 896-902), and trespass, in most jurisdictions, requires an element
of intent or fault (see 1 id. § 1.4, at 11-16). But the damaging infliction of external costs can
be unintentional and unavoidable, despite due care. See Wright v. Masonite Corp. 368 F.2d
661 (4th Cir. 1966) ("no negligence" and "invasion ... unintentional" in harmful release of
formaldehyde gas); Juergensmeyer, supra note 184, at 1138-48; 62 HARV. L. REv. 704,
704-06 (1949).
Public nuisance requires proof of "special damage" in the use of a public right, a very
serious historical hurdle. See Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 250-64 (1972). For an analysis of the
use of public nuisance doctrine in nineteenth century American law to defeat private dam-
age remedies and "to extend to private companies virtually the same immunity from law
suits that the state received under the theory of consequential damages," see M. HORWITZ,
supra note 83, at 76-78.
The Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine, if it ever really was relevant to injury beyond private
real property interests, is now being brought back "closer to [private] nuisance." H. STREET,
supra note I10, at 255.
The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher ... derives from ... [the] mutual duties of
... neighbouring landowners and its congeners are trespass and nuisance. If its
foundation is to be found in the injunction sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
then it is manifest that it has nothing to do with personal injuries.
Read v. Lyons, [1947] A.C. 156, 173. For a discussion of the development of §§ 519 and
520 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) (abnormally
dangerous activities), see Katz, supra note 139, at 643-44. That author wisely saw the role
of strict liability for abnormal activities in technology assessment as being more limited than
that of historical private nuisance doctrine. Id. at 645.
186 In the common law, the "commune" or the "commonalty" meant "the people of the
whole realm" or "all the Kings subjects," as opposed to the King, the nobles, or the "com-
mons" in Parliament. E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *539.
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ship differs from state s6vereignty and state ownership in fee, al-
though the state often holds the title in trust for the beneficial
ownership interests of the people. In Rome, England, and
America, the doctrine has regulated the use of property by both
state and private owners. Although not a theory of tort liability,
res communes as a doctrine of ownership allows for an extension of
tort theory to protect commonly-owned property and property
rights.
A. Roman Law and English Law
The doctrine of res communes originated in Roman law. Al-
though the concept of nonexclusive ownership is found scattered
among the writings of several classical Roman jurists, as preserved
in the great Digest,18 7 the fame of res communes among English
lawyers probably derived from a passage in Justinian's Institutes: 188
"By natural law, these things are the common property of all: air,
running water, the sea, and with it the shores of the sea." 189
The common definition of res communes today is "[those
things which, though a separate share of them can be enjoyed and
used by everyone, cannot be exclusively and wholly appropriated;
[Flor this word commune and comminaltie: so as [a le commune] here signifieth not
to the commons of the realm, but to the people of the whole realm; and
herewith agreeth our books, that for a common nusance, which concerns Le
commune, ou le comminaltie, le suit serr' done au roy, where [commune] and [com-
minaltie] include all the kings subjects.
Id. See 1 Jowrrr's DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAw 394 (2d ed. 1977). The expression was
later used to describe, rationally enough, the body of any society or corporation, as distin-
guished from its officers. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 347 (4th ed. 1951).
187 See DIGEST 1.8.2, 1.8.4, 1.8.5, 1.8.6, 18.1.6, 41.1.14, 41.1.15, 41.1.50, 43.7.1, 43.7.2,
43.8.1, 43.8.2, 43.8.3, 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.8.6, 43.8.7, 43.12.1, 43.12.3, 43.13.1, 43.14.1,
43.15.1. One of the earliest Roman references to nonexclusive ownership is in the INsTI-
TUTES OF GAIUS 2.1, 2.10, 2.11. Gaius' treatment of ownership doctrine was, however, in
this respect simplistic. "All he does is to divide res humani iuris [things subject to human
right] into publicae and privatae. He fails to mention the interesting category of res com-
munes." F. DE ZULUETA, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIus pt. 2, at 56 (1953) (footnote omitted).
Cebus and Pomponius, writing even before Gaius, in the period 80-129 (id. at x), also had
distinguished between things which could be subject to private ownership and things
which, because of their "permanent appropriation to public uses," were not so subject (id.
at 56). This included property and places "such as are not the object of commerce, but are
public property, which, while they do not absolutely belong to the people, are used for
public purposes, as, for instance, the Campus Martius." DIGEST 18.1.6 (Pomponius).
188 H. JOLowIcz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 502-03 (2d
ed. 1954). Althbugh the Institutes were designed to be an "introductory text-book" for stu-
dents, "they have themselves the validity of an imperial statute." Id. at 502.
19 INSTITUTES 2.1.1 (author's translation).
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as, light, air, running water."' 90  The words as originally used in
Roman law referred to any common property, "[tihings belonging
to two or more owners (co-owners, co-heirs) as a common prop-
erty."'191 Things which were "'by natural law ... the common
property of all men'" were called, by the Romans, res communes
omnium. 92
In fact, the Roman texts, as transmitted and editorialized by
the Byzantine compilers of the Emperor Justinian, never defined
res communes omnium as clearly as the modern usage. The fertile
Roman juristic intelligence had created four other conceptual
categories of "things" capable of nonexclusive ownership or in-
capable of ownership: res universitatis, 193 res sacrae or religiosae,194
19u 3 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 2905 (3d rev. 8th ed. 1914). See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1469 (4th ed. 1951); 2 C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD
140-41 (3d ed. 1937). In recent American cases the concept is usually discussed in the
context of the residual Spanish civil law ideas in Texas and California. See, e.g., Luttes v.
State, 159 Tex. 500, 525-26, 324 S.W.2d 167, 182 (1958).
191 A. BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 677 (1953). See also CODE
4.52, 8.20.
192 A. BERGER, supra note 191, at 677 (quoting DIGEST 1.8.2.pr., 1.8.2.1 (Marcianus)).
According to Buckland, "Ithe conception of res communes omnium is late. It may be due to
Marcian, but is sometimes held to be Byzantine." W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN
LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 182 n.9 (3d ed. P. Stein rev. 1963). Marcian, a good
deal of whose writing was preserved in the Digest, lived in the first half of the third century
A.D. See A. BERGER, supra note 191, at 578; H. ROBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
JUSTINIAN'S DIGEST at cciv-ccv (1884).
... Res universitatis were things "belonging to a corporate body, not to individuals" such
as "theatres, race-courses, and other similar places belonging in common to a whole city."
INSTITUTES 2.1.6. See also DIGEST 1.8.6.1. The concept of res universitatis is the closest
Roman analogy to ordinary modern ownership by a state or state entity. See generally T.
SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 160 (1876).
94 Res sacrae or religiosae were "duly consecrated by pontiffs, as sacred buildings and
offerings, properly dedicated to the service of God, which we have forbidden by our con-
stitution to be sold or mortgaged, except for the purpose of purchasing the freedom of
captives." INSTITUTES 2.1.8. See DIGEST 1.8.1, 1.8.8, 1.8.9, 18.1.6, 43.8.2.19. See also W.
BUCKLAND, supra note 192, at 183-84. The walls and gates of a city were also subject to
special protection and called res sanctae. See DIGEST 1.8.11; INSTITUTES 2.1.10; INSTITUTES
OF GAIUS 2.8; W. BUCKLAND, supra note 192, at 184.
195 Res publicae were things "common to all men" such as rivers and ports. INSTITUTES
2.1.2. See DIGEST 1.8.6.1, 18.1.6, 43.7.1, 43.8.2, 43.8.5, 43.8.6, 43.8.7, 43.12.1, 43.12.3,
43.13.1, 43.14.1, 43.15.1. "The word publicus is sometimes used as equivalent to communis,
but is properly used, as here, for what belongs to.... a particular people, but may be used
and enjoyed by all men." T. SANDARS, supra note 193, at 158. The concepts of res communes
and res publicae actually were very similar. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 192, at 184-85. But res
publicae carried the additional implication of state ownership of the concerned property. See
id. at 183, 185 n.1. Res publicae constituted "[plublic property such as theatres, market
places, rivers, harbors, etc. ... On the contrary RES COMMUNES OMNIUM were not
considered property of the Roman people although their use was accessible to all citizens."
A. BERGER, supra note 191, at 679. Perhaps another commentator gave the best articulation
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res publicae,195 and res nullius.196  There was also an extensive law
of city hygiene and cleanliness, similar to modern public nuisance
law, enforceable by the aediles, a kind of Roman magistrate. 97
Scholars have long debated the nature of the ownership rights in
res communes and res publicae.' 98 Although much of this debate
centered on whether individuals could sue for damages or an in-
junction if a res communes was damaged, 99 the Romans clearly
conceived of a "middle ground" between absolute individual own-
ership and ownership by the state that was not limited to property
owned by no one. It was, in the words of Pomponius, public
property "not the object of commerce" and did "not absolutely
belong to the people" but was "used for public purposes." 200  In
modern terms, Roman ownership doctrine permitted more alter-
natives than state communism, individual private ownership, and
anarchy.
of the concept: "[Res publicae] were in the ownership of the State, but this was not ...
private ownership at all, but public ownership, subject to special rules .... F. SCHUt.Z,
CLASSICAL ROMAN LAw 340 (1951).
196 Res nullius were things which "belong to no one" (INSTITUTES 2.1.7), either because
they were unappropriated by anyone, such as unoccupied lands or wild animals, or things
similar to res sacrae or res religiosae "to which a religious character prevents any human right
of property attaching" (T. SANDARS, supra note 193 at 160). See DIGEST 1.8.1, 1.8.2. See also
W. BUCKLAND, supra note 192, at 184.
M97 See DIGEST 43.10.1, 43.11.1.
198 VEGTING, DOMAINE PUBLIC ET REs EXTRA COMMERCIUM 36-51 (1950). Compare R. LEE,
THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAw at 109-11 (4th ed. 1956) with W. BUCKLAND, supra note 192,
at 182-85 and W. HUNTER, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 65-66 (9th ed. rev. 1965). See
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. REv. 471, 475 (1970); Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting Greater Resource Allocation: From
Rome to New Jersey, 25 RUTGERS L. Rv. 571, 576 (1971). These debates cast doubt on the
credibflity of one commentator's remarks that: "Where subsequent law is found to differ,
proponents of the public trust can hold the original Roman law up as a useful model of
doctrinal purity to which we should return." Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Some-
time Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 764 (1970).
199 See W. HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC AND HISTORICAL EXPOSITION OF ROMAN LAw IN THE
ORDER OF A CODE 165 (1876); Note, supra note 198, 79 YALE L.J. at 788 n.124. But see Sax,
supra note 198, at 475. The classical texts that have survived simply do not answer the
question conclusively, but there is some evidence that a private reparation of injury was
possible. According to Ulpian,
[wihere anyone is prevented from fishing in, or sailing upon the sea, he will not
be entitled to this interdict, just as in the case of a person who is prevented
from taking part in games in a public field, or bathing in a public bath, or
being present in a theater; but in all these cases an action for reparation of
injury must be employed.
DIGEST 43.8.2.9. See also id. 43.8.5, 43.8.6, 43.13.1.9, 43.13.1.10, 43.15.1.3, 43.15.1.5 (evi-
dence of legal relief, both prohibitive and reparative, for individual injury in use of res
communes or res publicae).
200 DIGEST 18.1.6.
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The res communes doctrine entered English law early. The
most important vehicle was probably the treatise called Bracton,20 '
which was completed in 1256 or 1257.202 That work clearly re-
flects the influence of the Romans.20 3 Bracton preserved the
Roman distinctions between public property, property belonging
to no one, property belonging to individuals, and property of a
common nature.20 4 Bracton's definition of res communes included
the sea and its shores, air, and running water. 20 5  Res publicae in-
cluded the right to fish in ports or rivers and to use river
banks.20 6 City buildings belonged to the civic corporations as res
universitatis.20 7 In various forms, Bracton's description found its
way into many other great treatises of the common law.20 8
Although it is not absolutely clear that the Romans had a pri-
vately enforceable legal remedy for disturbing the enjoyment of
res communes,2 °9 the English by the sixteenth century had almost
created such a remedy in the laws of the forest.210  Obviously, no
201 See 2 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 39-41.
202 Thorne, Translator's Preface to 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at v.
203 T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 28, at 261-62.
204 2 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 39-41.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 40.
207 Id.
20 See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *14, 18, 395; 1 BRITTON bk. 2, ch. 2, § 1, at
*84b; R. CALLIS, UPON THE STATUTE OF 23 H. 8 CAP. 5 OF SEWERS 78 (2d ed. London 1685)
(lst ed. London 1647); J. COWELL, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 54-55 (Lon-
don 1651); FLETA bk. 3, ch. 1, reprinted in 89 SELDEN SOC'Y 1-2 (1972); 2 J. KENT, COMMEN-
TARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *347-48; J. SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM ch. 2 (London 1635). See also
Wiel, Natural Communism: Air, Water, Oil, Sea, and Seashore, 47 HARV. L. REv. 425, 425 n.2
(1934). Wiel, however, viewed the res communes theory differently from the earlier writers.
See note 273 infra.
209 For incomplete evidence that such an action did-exist, see note 199 supra. The Ro-
mans certainly did possess enforceable rights called praedial servitudes that protected pri-
vate property owners' enjoyment of light within city bounds, and other common rights. B.
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 141-44 (1962).
210 Ironically, the lust of medieval English monarchs for the hunt led to these first con-
servation laws, elaborate rules that defined and protected the royal forests. These laws,
enforced by an elaborate structure of wardens, foresters, agisters, and a chiefjustic6 of the
forest, not only punished poaching and exploitation of the royal forests but also exerted a
wide authority over the many Englishmen who lived in or next to the royal forests. Under
the forests laws, these persons had limited, but valuable, rights to pasture animals in the
forest, to cut some kinds of wood, to hunt animals defined as vermin, and to travel in the
forest. See Turner, Introduction to SELECT PLEAS OF THE FOREST, 13 SELDEN SOCIETY (1899);
Young, The Forest Eyre in England During the Thirteenth Century, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 321
(1974). For the classic treatise on the forest laws, see J. MANWOOD, A TREATISE AND DIS-
COURSE OF THE LAWES OF THE FORREST (London 1598), cited in United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 721 (1978) (dissenting opinion, Powell, J.).
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private person had a freehold interest in the forest except the
King, but injury to those who had rights to use the forest was
subject to three nuisance actions, nocumentum commune, nocumentum
speciale, and nocumentum generale.21I The first action protected
against "a general hurt and annoyance, as wel unto all the In-
habitants and dwellers within the Forest, as- also unto the wild
beastes of the same. 212
Neither the common law nor the forest law would normally
permit an individual to bring a private action for relief. It was
argued that this would lead to limitless actions, each alleging no
damage greater than that suffered by all of the King's sub-
jects.2 1 3  But if a nuisance specifically affected a local community,
The forest laws were technically distinct from the common law. Although Coke stated
that "the law of the forest is allowed, and bounded by the common laws of this realm" (E.
COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *290), he later
acknowledged that "the forest laws differ in many cases from the common laws of Eng-
land" (id. at *315). But the common law courts "exercised a sort of superintendence." See I
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 348-49. In practice, "there was some intermingling of
forest law and common law," including an intermingling of "pleas of the forest and com-
mon law pleas." Young, supra, at 329-30. One obvious reason for this fact was that
"[i]mportant officials were involved in the operations of both kinds of courts" and the
cooperation of the sheriff was required to make the forest laws effective. Id. at 329-30.
211 J. MANWOOD, supra note 210, fol. 102-03.
212 Id. fol. 102. Nocumentum speciale was a nuisance that "tendeth specially ad nocumentum
ferarum, to the hurt of the wild beastes of the Forrest." Id. Nocumentum generale was basically
a nuisance to the "Vert" or the trees and plants of the forest, although it also included
all Surchargers of the commons, and Agistors of their owne pastures and
landes, which by eating up of their pastures and commons so bare, that the
Deare can have no feede there left.... and all manner of trespasses, that do
tend to the hurt or distruction of any herbage of pasture within The Forest.
Id.
This action was brought before the Lord Chief Justice in Eyre of the Forest through
procedure similar to the prosecution of a public nuisance.
213 A contemporary case described the law that may have included the forest courts:
A man shall not have an action on the case for a nuisance done in the highway,
for it is a common nuisance, and then it is not reasonable that a particular
person should have the action; for by the same reason that one person might
have an action for it, by the same reason every one might have an action, and
then he would be punished 100 times for one and the same cause. But if any
particular person afterwards by the nuisance done has more particular damage
than any other, there for that particular injury, he shall have a particular action
on the case: and for common nuisances [i.e., public nuisances], which are equal
to all the King's liege people, the common law has appointed other Courts for
the correction and reforming of them, scil. tourns, leets, &c.
Williams's Case, 5 Coke 72b, 73a, 77 Eng. Rep. 163, 164-65 (K.B. 1592). See T. BLOUNT,
NOMO-XE'IKON (London 1670) (definition of "nusance"); G. JACOB, A NEw LAW-
DICTIONARY (3d ed. London 1736) (1st ed. London 1729) (definition of "nusance").
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adjoining inhabitants could bring a private action."' For exam-
ple, a private nuisance action may have been allowed for disturb-
ing a common watering place because the injury specially affected
the local users of the water more than the public at large. 215
Actions to protect a mere right to use property, even when
that right was not one of exclusive possession, were very old in
England, even in Coke's day. Early praecipe and questus est writs,
and others, protected mere rights of use, when the plaintiffs had
no right to exclusive possession of the land or water involved, and
the assize of novel disseisin could lie to protect any kind of common
appurtenant to a free tenement. 216  Examples included rights of
common pasture, rights of fishery, rights of estovers, and rights
of way.217 Most of these rights, however, required that the plain-
tiff possess a freehold tenement to which the rights attached, in
214 See Fowler v. Sanders, Cro. Jac. 446, 79 Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B. 1617); Robert Marys's
Case, 9 Coke I Ilb, l13a, 77 Eng. Rep. 895, 898-99 (K.B. 1613). See also notes 59-62 and
accompanying text supra.
215 But though action may not be brought for a common nusance, but indictment or
presentment; yet where the inhabitants of a town had by custom a watering place
for their cattle which was stopped by another, it has been held, that any inhabitant
might have an action against him, otherwise they would be without remedy, because
such a nusance is not common to all the King's subjects.
G. JACOB, supra note 213 (definition of "nusance"). Such a nuisance could not be justified
by prescription. Fowler v. Sanders, Cro. Jac. 446, 79 Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B. 1617). Bracton
suggested that in certain cases, particularly in the context of running water, a wrongful
nuisance may arise because of the "common and public welfare" despite a lack of injuria to
any particular individual. 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 191. See id. at 191-93, 196. See also 3
FLETA, reprinted in 89 SELDEN SOC'Y 112 (1972). Of course, Bracton was written before there
was a clear delineation between public and private nuisance doctrines, but these statements
appear in the sections on possessory assizes.
21I See 3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 188-89; GLANVILL, supra note 23, at 168-69. As the
translation of Bracton noted, "[a] nuisance of this kind does not differ substantially from a
disseisin, and ought therefore to be removed by the assise, when it is wrongful." Id. at 190.
Because the assize of novel disseisin also lay for an invasion of rights in common land, an
injury to common rights appendant to a freehold was also an actionable nuisance. Id. at
190-91. See EARLY REGISTERS OF WRITS, reprinted in 87 SELDEN Soc'Y 71-74 (1970).
27 Common pasture, for example, was very important before the enclosure of feudal
lands. See I E. LiPsON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 78-84, 159 (12th ed. 1959).
Enclosure later ensured exclusive private property as the major modern form of property
holding, but it was not fully established by 1600. For discussions of enclosure generally, see
G. DAVIES, THE EARLY STUARTS, 1603-1660, at 279-82 (2d ed. 1959); A. HARDING, A So-
CIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 325 (1966); 1 E. LIPSON, supra, at 136-50, 159-64; J. MACKIE,
THE EARLIER TUDORS 1485-1558, at 448-53, 504-06 (1952). Early land radicals, the
"Diggers" or "True Levellers," bitterly fought enclosure and possessed a fickle ally in
Oliver Cromwell. See C. HILL, GOD'S ENGLISHMAN 18, 61, 260-61 (1970). For contemporary
views on enclosure, see R. POWELL, DEPOPULATION ARRAIGNED, CONVICTED AND CONDEMNED
BY THE LAWES OF GOD AND MAN 55-56 (London 1636).
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the manner of modern easements appurtenant. The assize of
nuisance always recited the free tenement of the plaintiff.218
To circumvent this free tenement barrier, plaintiffs began to
experiment with action on the case pleadings in the sixteenth cen-
tury. By William Aldred's Case, the action on the case in nuisance
had become an acceptable alternative, and a preferable pleading,
to the assize of nuisance.219  Although the case form demanded
some interest in land, the exact nature of the requisite interest
remains unclear. 22 '  Rights of way and similar easements ap-
peared sufficient.22 '
Had the concept of res communes endured in English courts
after the widespread adoption of case pleadings, nuisance on the
case could conceivably have protected rights to res communes just as
it protected rights of tenants. Mere undivided ownership, consist-
ing only of a right to use rather than a right to exclusive posses-
sion, would not have barred a potential plaintiff. After the de-
velopment of case, the courts dropped the requirement of a free
tenement. The proprietary right to use the res communes might
have generally sufficed to give standing, as it did for common
watering places.222
But the development of the res communes doctrine halted soon
after the writings of Manwood and Coke, probably because own-
ership theory changed. The success of the enclosure movement
hastened the transition to equating true ownership with exclusiv-
ity. 22 s  Grotius said that res communes, being unbounded, could
not constitute property, 24 and others made similar statements.225
218 See text accompanying notes 29, 59 supra.
219 See text accompanying note 60 supra. A plaintiff could have an action on the case to
recover damages to his rights of common pasture from a defendant whose cattle escaped
and ate the grass. Robert Marys's Case, 9 Coke 11 lb, 113a-136, 77 Eng. Rep. 895, 898-900
(K.B. 1613).
220 See C. FIFOOT, supra note 21, at 95.
221 See id.
222 See text accompanying notes 213-15 supra.
223 See 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw *403-05. Kent noted that "the change
of manners and property, and the condition of society in this country, is so great, that the
whole of this law of commonage is descending fast into oblivion." Id. at *405. See also note
217 supra.
224 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PAclS, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 3, at 190-91 (F. Kelsey trans.
1925) (1st ed. Paris 1625).
225 "[Plroprietorship or dominion is a right whereby the substance, as it were, of some-
thing belongs to a person in such a way that it does not belong in its entirety to another
person in the same manner." S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OtrO
533 (C. Oldfather & W. Oldfather trans. 1934) (lst ed. Lund 1672). But see E. DE VArrEL,
LE DROIT DES GENS bk. 1, ch. 20 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916) (1st ed. London 1758).
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The exclusive ownership theory became dominant in America,226
where Louisiana and California incorporated it into their civil
codes 227 and Oliver Wendell Holmes endorsed it.228 This trend
226 In the later eighteenth century, Justice James Wilson wrote:
Exclusive property multiplies the productions of the earth, and the means
of subsistence....
By exclusive property, the productions of the earth and the means of sub-
sistence are secured and preserved, as well as multiplied. What belongs to no
one is wasted by every one. What belongs to one man in particular is the object
of his economy and care.
Exclusive property prevents disorder, and promotes peace....
The conveniences of life depend much on an exclusive property.
J. WILSON, On the History of Property, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 719 (R. McCloskey
ed. 1967).
227 See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 488 (West 1952) (ownership is "the right by which a
thing belongs to some one in particular, to the exclusion of all other persons"); CAL. CIv.
CODE ANN. § 654 (West 1954) (ownership of thing is "the right of one or more persons to
possess and use it to the exclusion of others").
228 O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 246 (1881). Holmes concluded that an "owner is
allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no one." Id. Other legal writers offer similar
definitions. See. e.g., K. DIGBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 305 (5th ed. 1897); H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 2-3 (3d ed. abr. R.
Berman ed. 1970). Calling "exclusive control" the "very center of the concept of private
property," Professor Brown concluded that "certain physical things, such as air, light, and
running water are by their very nature incapable of being owned" because no one can
control them exclusively. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 7 (2d ed. 1955).
The exclusivity test of ownership remains alive in modern America. One court recently
stated that "'[an essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude
others from enjoying it."' Blaustein v. Burton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 161, 177, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319,
329 (1970) (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(dissenting opinion, Brandeis, J.)). Another court has said that "the traditional test of own-
ership is the power to exclude others." Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 503,
506 (10th Cir. 1957).
But this test might be yielding to a more flexible standard that would possibly permit
the ownership of res communes. For example, one court has declared that "'the meaning to
be given to the word [property] depends upon the sense in which it is used, as gathered
from the context and the nature of the things which it was intended to refer to and in-
clude.'" Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 443, 449, 205 P.2d 402, 407 (1949) (quoting
Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (1945)). A second court
has stated that
[t]he word [owner] usually signifies one who has the legal or rightful title, but
this is not always the sense in which it is employed. It is not rigid in meaning,
especially in ordinances and statutes.... The meaning usually depends, in great
measures, upon the context and the subject matter to which it is applied.
Robinson v. Walker, 63 Ill. App. 2d 204, 209, 211 N.E.2d 488, 491 (1965).
This relative test of ownership approaches the original English and Roman concept in
which the term "owner" included anyone with an ownership right, such as right to use.
Max Rheinstein remarked on the late development of the concept of title in English law:
"Only in recent times have the terms 'fee' and, more recently, 'title' assumed a meaning
which comes near to that of the Roman dominium, which indicates the sum total of all rights
and benefits which may be derived from a piece of land (as well as from a chattel)." MAX
WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 221 n.77 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954). For Weber's
own discussion, see id. at 221-22.
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overwhelmed the law protecting common areas, 22 9 and many cities
sold such areas in fee. 230  The cities assumed that they could pass
good title, free of commonalty claims.
The exclusive ownership theory encouraged developing
American industries to exploit the air, running water, sea, and
seashores.23' Owned by "no one," these things were theoretically
free to all comers, and vulnerable to overuse.2 32  Because states
hesitated to discourage industry by use of public nuisance pow-
ers,233 and special damages limitations precluded private suits to
protect public users,234 the overuse continued. Even where special
damage to private property occurred, difficulties in determining
causation, in apportioning damages, and in overcoming the
balancing of utilities test could effectively bar private remedy.235
B. American Law
Ironically, excessive generosity by a state toward industry led
to the surprising American resurrection of the res communes doc-
trine in 1892. In Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,23 6 the Supreme
229 For example, Massachusetts enacted statutes that provided for the partition of com-
mon areas. See 1786 Mass. Acts and Laws ch. 53, at 171-72; 1783 Mass. Acts and Laws ch.
39, at 599.
230 For example, the present Cambridge Common represents just the tip of a much
larger seventeenth century common. The original common extended far to the northwest.
See CAMBRIDGE HISTORICAL COMMISSION, SURVEY OF ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY IN CAM-
BRIDGE, REPORT FOUR: OLD CAMBRIDGE 12-19 (1973).
English commons and manorial wastes suffered a similar fate. See The Commons Act,
1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 56, § 2; The Commons Act, 1899, 62 & 63 Vict., ch. 30, §§ 1-3; The
Commons Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, ch. 44, § 1; The Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo.
5, ch. 20, §§ 193-94. See also 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 315.
231 Riparian rights were of course important in early America and "gave rise to the first
important legal questions bearing on the relationship of property law to private economic
development." M. HoRwITZ, supra note 83, at 34.
232 Cf. Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV., PAPERS AND
PROCEEDING 347, 354 (1967) (common property subject to overuse). Demsetz's argument
that communal property was generally subject to exploitation has been proven false. Full
freedom to exploit communal property rarely existed in any culture, even primitive
societies. See Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, "Common Property" as a Concept in Natural Resources
Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713, 714-21 (1975). Early English commons were regulated by
community customs. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 57-58. Abusing one's share
of a common pasture, for example, was remedied by a writ of ad measurement of pasture.
3 BRACTON, supra note 13, at 182-89; 1 BRITTON bk. 2, ch. 27, §§ 1-9 at *148b-50. See
generally THE LAw OF COMMONS AND COMMONERS (London 1698).
23 See note 160 supra.
234 See text accompanying note 185 supra.
23- See Hartquist & King, A Reprint from Capitol Hill, 22 HARV. L. SCH. B., Dec. 1970, at
20-22; Katz, supra note 139, at 616-18.
236 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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Court voided the state's grant in fee to a railroad of a large sec-
tion of land submerged beneath Lake Michigan in the Chicago
harbor. The decision held that the people of the state, not the
state itself, were the land's beneficial owners. Justice Field, writing
for the majority, declared that the state held the title to the sub-
merged land, but the state held it "in trust for the people of the
State." '237 He added that "[tihe State can no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people are interested ...
than it can abdicate its police powers." 23 8 In analyzing the prop-
erty interests, Justice Field followed the argument of John Miller,
counsel for the City of Chicago. Miller had argued that:
The bed of Lake Michigan ... is held by the people of the
State of Illinois in their sovereign capacity, and de communijure,
and wholly in trust for the public, and for the public uses, for
which it is adapted. And the same was not held by the State in
any proprietary or private right or as its demesne, and was not
as to a large tract, extending a mile into the deep water of the
open lake, and composing the outer harbor, and entrance to
the inner harbor of a great commercial city, the subject of a
private grant or contract.2 39
Miller restated precisely the traditional res communes doctrine.
Both the Romans and Bracton recognized that the state could sell
ordinary real property to private parties. But certain things re-
mained incapable of exclusive ownership in fee by the state or by
any individual. A private grant that ignored the public interest in
the res could never dispose of such things because they belonged
to the commonalty. For Miller, the Chicago harbor was a res com-
munes, and the Supreme Court agreed.
A complete discussion of either the full political background
of Illinois Central 2 40 or its effect on American property law is
beyond the scope of this Article. The debate over the case has
raged for nearly ninety years. Recently, Professor Sax, in a lead-
237 Id. at 452. Justice Field clearly saw a trust in the true property sense, because he
distinguished between lands the state owned in fee and lands in which the state held legal
title in trust for the people as beneficial owners. Id. This statement reflects the traditional
view that the commonalty, not the state, owns property of a res communes nature. Justice
Field himself stated that "[the holding of this case) follows necessarily from the public
character of the property, being held by the whole people for purposes in which the whole
people are interested." Id. at 456.
238 Id. at 453.
239 Id. at 421.
240 One commentator has hinted at the potential corruption behind the case. See Sax,
supra note 198, at 490-91.
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ing article, attempted to separate the public trust rationale of
Illinois Central from traditional property doctrine, including res
communes, by transforming it into a principle of administrative
law.24' The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Paepcke v. Public Build-
ing Commission,242 cited Sax's article,243 but continued to find the
basis of a public trust in a public ownership interest in a res com-
munes. 2 44  The Illinois Supreme Court chose the right course.
The use of a res communes property doctrine in defending the en-
vironment will bear more fruit than Professor Sax's approach.
Contrary to Professor Sax's view, the property doctrine of
Illinois Central is inseparable from the remainder of the case. Not
only did the arguments 245 and the majority opinion 246 focus on
the property question, but the Court's use of property doctrine
was the primary target of the dissenters' attack. Justice Shiras, dis-
senting, wrote:
That the ownership of a State in the lands underlying its navi-
gable waters is as complete, and its power to make them the
subject of conveyance and grant is as full, as such ownership
and power to grant in the case of the other public lands of the
State, I have supposed to be well settled.247
Sax argued against viewing the public trust in Illinois Central
as a true property trust because the Court refused to prohibit
absolutely conveying title to such property.248 Instead, the Court
instructed lower courts to determine a grant's validity in light of
the circumstances. 49 Sax reasoned that the public trust doctrine
tests the validity of government action as a matter of administra-
tive law, rather than as a question of res communes property doc-
trine. 50
241 Sax, supra note 198.
242 46 Ill. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970).
243 Id. at 336-38, 263 N.E.2d at 15-16.
244 Id. at 341, 263 N.E.2d at 18.
24- In reference to other lake front land owned by the city, Miller described the City of
Chicago as "owner in fee, in trust for public uses." 146 U.S. at 419.
246 See text accompanying notes 236-39 supra.
247 146 U.S. at 465.
241 Sax, supra note 198, at 489.
249 Id. at 489-91.
250 Id. Sax stated:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general
public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental
conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted
uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.
Id. at 490 (emphasis in original).
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This argument rests on the false notion that the state cannot
alienate the title to a res communes. As Justice Field explained, the
state can dispose of the res under circumstances that protect any
beneficial interests of the public.2 51 The public trust vests legal
title to res communes in the state as a convenience in most cases, but
other groups can also hold the title. Indeed, private boards held
titles to many New England commons, subject to the public trust
for the commonalty.2 52
Sax's argument is close to the position taken by Professor
Trelease in an earlier article2 53 on Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. All
Parties and Persons.254  Following Illinois Central, the California
Supreme Court in Ivanhoe Irrigation used property doctrine to
support a public trust. The court said:
[T]he state is not the owner of the domestic water of the state
in the sense that it has absolute power and dominion over it to
the exclusion of the rights of those who have the beneficial in-
terest therein. The title is an equitable one residing in the water
users of the state. The state as an entity is the holder of the
legal title as trustee for the benefit of the people of the state, all
of whom in the last analysis, are the water users of the state. 255
In Ivanhoe Irrigation, as in the Illinois Central, the dissenting judges
explicitly opposed the majority's knowing use of a property doc-
trine. 56 To explain such language while avoiding a res communes
property doctrine, Trelease argued that the courts called some-
thing a "trust" merely to "put across the thought more forcefully"
when they only meant it was "like a trust." 2 57  Sax and Trelease,
But the Illinois Central Court's holding rests on completely different ground. The
Court never held the government's conduct questionable in the abstract. Instead, the case
turned on the nature of the property interest involved. In addition, Sax never clearly ex-
plains what he means by "considerable skepticism." Professor Jaffe implies that Sax really
has no clear meaning. See Jaffe, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1566-68 (1971)
(reviewing J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971)).
The Court in Illinois Central set out to determine title, and it did. 146 U.S. at 433, 463.
It did not exercise judicial review, but determined where the property interests lay as a
matter of law. The Court never scrutinized the government's actual conduct in deciding
the ownership issue.
251 146 U.S. at 452-53.
252 See note 229 supra.
253 Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638 (1957).
254 47 Cal. 2d 597, 306 P.2d 824 (1957), rev'd sub nom. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v.
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to deal with
the question of ownership. 357 U.S. at 290-91.
255 47 Cal. 2d at 625, 306 P.2d at 840.
256 Id. at 648, 306 P.2d at 855.
25' Trelease, supra note 253, at 648 (emphasis in original).
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in their eagerness to avoid a property basis for the public trust
doctrine, had to rewrite the courts' clear language.
Sax offered two reasons for discarding the property
background to the public trust doctrine. First, Sax noted:
At most, the government may resolve that certain resources will
be used for specific purposes-for instance, that land is to be
set aside as a park. But it is reasonable to assume that such
decisions imply that the specified uses shall be available only
until the legislature decides to devote the land to some other
public purpose. 258
He reasoned that it is fruitless to try to demonstrate whether the
government conveys a complete title or merely designates a
specific, if transitory, purpose when the government grants a re-
source to the general public. Second, Sax believed that "[i]t makes
economic sense to prevent the government from taking the prop-
erty of an individual owner, but it is difficult to understand why
the government should be prevented from taking property which
is owned by the public as a whole."12 59 He concluded that the use
of' the government's condemnation power is not an appropriate
way to rededicate public land to a new use. Basically, Sax believed
that governments should not be bound to irrevocable commit-
ments through the res communes doctrine.
Sax's arguments are unpersuasive. The first argument begs
the question of whether the state or the commonalty initially
owned the res. But this question is exactly what courts must de-
cide. The second argument assumes that the state can never con-
vey title to res communes and that. every act of the government
which distributes costs equally over the entire commonalty is fair.
But states can alienate res communes, and courts must often serve
as the ultimate arbitrators of the fairness of such transactions even
when the public shares the costs equally. In fact, courts played
just that role under the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central and
Ivanhoe Irrigation. 2 6
Professor Jaffe has also criticized Sax's concept of the public
trust doctrine as being so vague as to introduce virtual de novo
court review into all administrative matters. 2 1 This result could
be prevented by restricting the public trust doctrine to its original
258 Sax, supra note 198, at 479.
259 Id.
260 See text accompanying notes 236-52 supra.
261 Jaffe, supra note 250, at 1566-68.
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base of property concepts and thus focusing on the clear and well-
established rules of property law. Jaffe's criticism helps to reveal
what may be the real reason Sax and Trelease have attempted
to separate the public trust doctrine from its original property
background-to make it more palatable to the courts. But Sax
himself admits that "[the most common theory advanced in sup-
port of a special trust obligation is a property notion." 2 62 Jaffe
correctly points out that a vague, apparently limitless doctrine of
public trust, neither clearly nor historically based, stands far less
chance of court acceptance than one firmly founded on ancient
property notions.263
The recent Paepcke case 26 4 illustrates that a public trust doc-
trine tied to property concepts is more acceptable. The central
question in this case was whether Chicago taxpayers had standing
to challenge the decision of the city to build schools in two city
parks.265 The court held that such taxpayers had an "equitable
interest ... in the public property" sufficient for standing because
of the public trust doctrine.26 6  Like the courts in Ivanhoe Irriga-
tion and Illinois Central, the Illinois court explained its decision in
terms of property doctrine:
Upon serious reconsideration of this question we now believe
that portion of the opinion in Droste dealing with the right and
standing of the plaintiff to sue should be overruled, as should
any other former decisions of this court holding that a citizen
and taxpayer has no right, in the absence of statute, to bring an
action to enforce the trust upon which public property is held unless
he is able to allege and prove special damage to his property. If
the "public trust" doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at
all, the members of the public, at least taxpayers who are the
beneficiaries of that trust, must have the right and standing to
enforce it.267
The adoption of a public trust theory did not restrict the flex-
ibility of the court's review. In fact, the court ultimately approved
the building of the schools. In so doing, it cited Sax's article, not
for the proposition that a property-based public trust doctrine was
infeasible but to support the proposition that no property doc-
262 See Sax, supra note 198, at 478.
26 See Jaffe, supra note 250, at 1567-68.
264 46 Il1. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970).
265 Id. at 340-41, 263 N.E.2d at 18.
266 Id. at 341, 263 N.E.2d at 18.
267 Id., 263 N.E.2d at 18 (emphasis added).
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trine which "prohibit[s] the government from ever accommodat-
ing new public needs by reallocating resources" could be sup-
ported.2 68  The public trust doctrine did not prevent the state
from changing a res communes from one beneficial use to
another.269  The state reallocated the property in a way which, as
a practical matter, attempted to protect the collective interests of
the public beneficial owners,270 with judicial review available as a
further safeguard.
The Paepcke court decided that the change in property use
was made "in good faith and for the public good," and was thus
within the state's discretion as trustee of the public trust property
held for the public's benefit.2 71 The decision, therefore, rested
upon a strong foundation of traditional property trust doctrine.
The court found that this res communes property doctrine provided
standing for members of the public who possessed no private
ownership interests and also a basis for careful judicial review of a
state's decision with regard to the parks in question. The case re-
veals that a res communes property basis for public trust review is
both palatable to courts and useful to environmentalists.
But change-in-use and alienation cases do not provide the
only possibilities for the constructive use of this ancient doctrine.
First, it could give standing for citizens or users to sue for pollu-
tion injuries to a res communes. Second, it might cause a shift in the
burden of proof required to prevent the use of res communes in
ways contrary to the public's beneficial ownership interest.
Public nuisance doctrine has long blocked the standing of
private citizens to bring pollution suits. Unless an individual can
show special damages, only the state, at its discretion, can sue for
public nuisance. 2  But beneficial owners of a res communes under
a state public trust should have standing to bring a mandamus
suit against the state to force a public nuisance suit to protect the
trust because "[a] trust imposes an affirmative duty upon the
trustee to hold and use the property for the exclusive benefit of
the beneficiary, and where that benefit involves conservation ob-
jectives, the government must act affirmatively to achieve its reali-
zation. 273  This approach would reduce the discretion enjoyed
268 Id. at 337, 263 N.E.2d at 16 (quoting Sax, supra note 198, at 482).
269 See text accompanying notes 251-52 supra.
270 See Illinois C.R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
271 46 Ill. 2d at 347, 263 N.E.2d at 21.
272 See W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 88, at 586-87.
273 Berlin, Kessler & Roisman, Law in Action: The Trust Doctrine, in LAW AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 171 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970).
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by some state attorneys general. At present, they can choose not
to bring a public nuisance suit, even where the facts would sup-
port one.274 Under the res communes doctrine, a member of the
public should at least have standing to bring a mandamus action to
demand such a suit when a res communes is threatened.
Despite the advantages of the doctrine, several natural limita-
tions would prevent it from resulting in excessive litigation. First,
a res communes must be at stake. Whether the particular property
in question constitutes a res communes would be a question of law
for the court's determination. Samuel Wiel provided some gui-
dance in defining the characteristics of a res communes by compar-
ing the lists of items considered to be res communes in various
American and English jurisdictions.275 Even radio and television
airwaves may be described as res communes, and efforts to buy
them in fee, despite any interest of the commonalty, have been
rejected.276 Second, the expense of bringing a mandamus action
211 See Jaffe, Standing to Sue in Conservation Suits, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 131 (M.
Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970). See also Katz, supra note 139, at 622. Statutes in Wisconsin
and Florida allow private citizens to sue in the name of the state to enjoin a nuisance. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 60.05 (West 1969 & West Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 823.02 (West
1977).
275 Wiel, supra note 208. Wiel's article, however, is limited to the "four natural com-
munisms" (air, running water, sea, and seashore), and does not attempt a general analysis
of ownership rights. Wiel also summarily rejected ownership ideas such as a public trust
because the theory would turn "negatives into some resembled positive." Id. at 426. His
rejection of ownership by the commonalty results in no ownership of res communes. Id. at
426. See Wiel, Running Water, 22 HARV. L. REV. 190, 190-96 (1909). But Wiel's own copious
examples, particularly those regarding rights to light, airport access, and radio waves, show
that equitable interests recognized by property law do accurately describe the public's in-
terest in res communes.
Other authorities disagree with the proposition that no one owns res communes. The
Supreme Court discussed res communes in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896).
Justice White cited the Napoleonic Code as summing up an "unbroken line of law and
precedent' on res communes. Id. at 526. The passage cited from the Napoleonic Code states
that "'[t]here are things which belong to no one, and the use of which is common to all."'
Id. In the next paragraph, Justice White refers to this as "the principle of common owner-
ship." Id. Importantly, Justice White recognized that although res communes belong to no
one, this does not mean that they are ownerless or owned by the state, but rather it means
that they are owned in common. Just because res communes "cannot be exclusively and
wholly appropriated" does not mean they cannot be owned in common, unless one assumes
the exclusivity test discussed earlier. See text accompanying notes 223-30 supra.
276 See Wiel, supra note 208, at 429-30. Wiel concluded that, at any time, "about the
closest to common right in Air is Radio." Id. at 456 (emphasis in original). The concept of
radio waves as res communes is consistent with federal legislation and recent Supreme Court
decisions. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) (United States shall "control" such waves and shall
permit "use" but not "ownership" by persons for limited periods of time). The Supreme
Court has indicated on several occasions that such control is to be governed by the public
interest. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969); Ashbacker
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would inhibit litigants from undertaking an action for trivial
reasons.27 7 In addition, if the state had undertaken other affirm-
ative action to protect the res communes in question, the courts
could find a public nuisance suit unnecessary to enforce the pub-
lic trust. Like any trustee, the state would be liable for abuse of
discretion.7 8 Finally, even a successful mandamus action would
not spell ultimate victory, but only access to a trial on the merits.
Beyond opening courts to environmental litigants, using res
communes property doctrine may furnish plaintiffs with another
significant advantage-a favorable burden of proof. When private
property is condemned, the owner normally bears the burden of
showing that the government acted arbitrarily. Although no cases
have established a different rule for the reallocation of res com-
munes, the recent New Jersey decision of Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc. forecasts a shift in the burden in
favor of environmental plaintiffs.2 7 9  In that case, the court insti-
tuted a special burden of proof rule when the state attempted to
condemn a pipeline right of way through a privately owned wet-
land wildlife preserve. 280  The court distinguished this situation
from "that of an ordinary property owner"281 because "defen-
dant's devotion of its land to a purpose which is encouraged and
often engaged in by government itself gives it a somewhat more
potent claim to judicial protection against taking ... by arbitrary
action of a condemnor."28 2  The more favorable burden of proof
rule may have tacitly reflected the public res communes interest in
the unique environmental value of the preserve's wetland, 283
without discriminating unfairly between private owners. Favoring
Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945); FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,
475 (1940). These statutes and cases are consistent with the concept of common beneficial
ownership of the airwaves by the public with the title held in trust by the national govern-
ment, which controls the use of the res communes for the public benefit. If this is true, sales
of airwaves to private concerns by the government would hVe to meet the standards of
Illinois Central. See text accompanying note 239 supra.
277 See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 617
(2d Cir. 1965) ("experience with public actions confirms the view that the expense and
vexation of legal proceedings is not lightly undertaken"), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
278 See G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRusTs 322-24 (5th ed.
1973).
279 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966).
280 Id. at 275, 225 A.2d at 138.
281 Id. at 268, 225 A.2d at 134.
282 Id. at 273, 225 A.2d at 137.
282 The preserve had been described by expert witnesses as "'the finest inland, natural
fresh water wetland in the entire Northeastern United States.' "Id. at 270, 225 A.2d at 135.
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the preserve in this case could easily end in unfair results if the
preserve's owners used its position to defeat the condemnation
proceedings and then sold the wetland to the pipeline company at
a higher price. In any event, if such a private owner merits a
special burden of proof rule, a res communes case, which more
clearly involves public ownership interests, would certainly deserve
at least this advantage.' 8 4
Res communes doctrine may soon enter the public spotlight.
Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Water Pollution has alleged
that a major polluter of water is the government itself.2 85 Nader,
in a press conference preceding the report's release, denounced
federal and state government agencies for treating water re-
sources as "their private sewers." Nader asserted: "water belongs
to no one-except the people."28 6 This is the spirit of the res
communes doctrine. Res communes interests would serve as a disin-
centive to governmental as well as private misbehavior.
In a 1979 landmark decision, Boston Waterfront Development
Corp. v. Commonwealth,287 the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts made a bold return to the spirit of Illinois Central. At
issue was the ownership of land "covered by the seaward end of a
wharf constructed over filled land, partly occupied by the corner
of an ancient granite building now renovated into modern shops,
offices, restaurants, and condominiums."18 8  Holding that the
title to the land was not an ordinary fee simple but was "subject to
the condition that it be used for a public purpose related to the
'promot[ion of] trade and commerce"' 28 9 the court stated:
The essential import of this holding is that the land in
question is not, like ordinary private land held in fee simple
absolute, subject to development at the sole whim of the owner,
but it is impressed with a public trust, which gives the public's
representatives an interest and responsibility in its development.
This concept is difficult to describe in language in complete
harmony with the language of the law ordinarily applied to pri-
vately owned property. We are not dealing with the allocation
284 The court implied as much when it compared the wildlife preserve with more public
enterprises. Id. at 268, 225 A.2d at 134.
285 See D. ZwrcK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 340-65 (1971).
286 Boston Evening Globe, Apr. 12, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
287 [1979] Mass. Adv. Sh. 1992.
288 Id. at 1993.
289 Id. at 2023.
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of property rights between private individuals when we are
concerned with a public resource such as Boston Harbor.290
In support of this holding, the court specifically referred to the
Roman property doctrine of res communes,2 9' the property doctrine
of Illinois Central,2 92 and the English law of jus privatum and jus
publicum in relation to the shoreland.293  According to the court:
Legislative awareness of this historical background is evi-
dent, for example, in an 1850 report of the Senate Joint Com-
mittee on Mercantile Affairs and Insurance concerning the flats
in Boston Harbor, in which the committee stated: "By the law
of all civilized Europe, before the feudal system obtained in
England, there was no such thing as property in tide waters.
Tide waters were res omnium, that is, they were for the com-
mon use, like air and light .... In England, the fiction of a
fee in the Crown, and the control of the trust in Parliament, we
understand to have been a mode, suited to the times and the
290 Id. at 2017.
291 The court stated that:
Throughout history, the shores of the sea have been recognized as a special
form of property of unusual value; and therefore subject to different legal
rules from those which apply to inland property. At Roman law, all citizens
held and had access to the seashore as a resource in common; in the words of
Justinian, "they (the shores] cannot be said to belong to anyone as private
property." Institutes of Justinian, 2.1.1-2.1.6 cited in Note, The Public Trust in
Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 Yale L.J. 762,
763 (1970), see David A. Rice, Final Report: A Study of the Law Pertaining to
the Tidelands of Massachusetts, 1971 House No. 4932, at 17-18.
Id. at 1994.
292 Extensively quoting Illinois Central, the court stated that:
This requirement, that such lands be granted only for public purposes, was
held by the Court to be central to the notion of governmental power. "The
State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested," the Court stated, "so as to leave them entirely under the use
and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for
the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can
be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than
it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the
preservation of the peace."
[1979] Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2014 (quoting Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453
(1892)).
292 The jus privatum/jus publicum distinction in regard to shoreland property was
carried over to the new world, so that the company's ownership was under-
stood to consist of a jus privatum which could be "parcelled out to corporation
and individuals ... as private property" and a jus publicum "in trust for public
use of all those who should become inhabitants of said territory ......
[1979] Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1997 (quoting Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9
Gray) 451, 483-84 (1857)) (footnote omitted). The same distinction was made regarding
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genius of the feudal law, for insuring to the State the control
over tide-waters. The Commonwealth succeeds to this right of
control." 294
The court concluded that "[t]he land below low water line can be
granted by the State only to fulfill a public purpose, and the
rights of the grantee to that land are ended when that purpose is
extinguished."2 9 5  This is close to the classic res communes prop-
erty doctrine.2 9 n
CONCLUSION
Honor6 observed that "a mature system of law" limits uses of
property that cause harm to others because "without them, 'own-
ership' would be a destructive force."129 7  During the nineteenth
century, however, the law "hewed to an ideal of competitive self-
assertion." 298 As Morton Horwitz has established, both English
and American courts relaxed their protection of the more passive
uses of property, and, in effect, subsidized developing industry by
forcing the cost of its by-products on society in general. 29 9 In this
atmosphere, the rationale of St. Helen's Smelting was misconstrued
as establishing a balancing of utilities doctrine that overrode the
previous absolute sic utere tuo guarantees of the common law to
the passive property holder.30 0 In addition, the relaxation of the
sic utere tuo guarantee removed an important incentive for indust-
rial control of pollution by improved technology.
The older common law, in contrast, constantly concerned it-
self with the concrete relations between individuals, especially in
its development of property doctrine. Lime kilns, tallow furnaces,
pig sties, and dyeing vats, although important to the social well-
being of seventeenth century England, 30 1 were viewed by the
the ownership of shorelands in colonial New Jersey. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 367, 411-13 (1842).
294 [1979] Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1996-97.
295 Id. at 2013.
296 All the more remarkable is that the res communes issues were arguably not raised
below, and that the relevant Massachusetts statute contained no explicit conditions for mak-
ing the grant in question. Id. at 2024-25 (dissenting opinion, Braucher, J.).
297 Honor6, supra note 5, at 123.
298 Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1, 15 (1933).
299 M. HORWITZ, supra note 83, at 63, 74-78.
.0 See notes 105-182 and accompanying text supra.
"o' j. DAWSON, supra note 86, at 269-70.
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courts in the context of the costs they inflicted on neighboring
property owners and not as isolated under ideal conditions. 30 2
Similarly, the earlier common law protected certain things of im-
portance to the entire community from private exploitation by
individual owners 0 3  These res communes, in theory, gave even
the humblest person a legal interest in a part of his environment.
The realization that the nineteenth century laissez faire ideals are
not inextricably a part of our civilization or our rule of law is an
important lesson that legal history can teach well.
In 1894, Professor John T. Dillon of Yale predicted that
American property law would see "important changes of sub-
stance and form" as it adapted to the new values in American
society. 30 4 Appropriately, the res communes doctrine, one of prop-
erty law's oldest elements, may assist in this change. The courts
can use it to clarify the protectable interests in things once consi-
dered freely exploitable, thus preventing social conflict by fairly
identifying and allocating the costs of life in a crowded world.
The sic utere tuo or the res communes doctrines should not
necessarily be restored to the present law in their old forms, or in
any form. But a historical perspective on law can often give "a
more significant perspective on legal reality than the logician's
analytic intelligence." 305 When looking out on those neighbor-
hoods that, in nineteenth century balancing of utilities terms, have
become "denaturalised," 306 the politician, the economist, the en-
gineer, and the lawyer can find inspiration in the roots of our
legal heritage.
The reason and spirit of cases make law; not the letter of par-
ticular precedents.
-Lord Mansfield 3"
302 See text accompanying notes 67, 71-72 supra.
303 See text accompanying notes 183-235 supra.
304 J. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 385 (1894).
303 Howe, Introduction to O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW at xix (M. Howe ed. 1968).
306 St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, II Eng. Rep. 1483, 1485 (H.L. 1865).
307 Fisher v. Prince, 3 Burr. 1363, 1364, 97 Eng. Rep. 876, 876 (K.B. 1762).
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